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ABSTRACT 
The US Navy is embracing the principles of Knowledge Management 
(KM).  One of the key components of KM is the Community of Practice.  
Communities of Practice are groups that form to share what they know, and to 
learn from one another regarding some aspect of their work.  Organizations are 
strengthened through an improved network of contacts and enhanced 
productivity from their personnel.  Personnel benefit through peer-group 
recognition and continuous learning.  This thesis seeks to provide an 
understanding of how the Naval Intelligence Community, through the 
implementation of Communities of Practice, can reduce duplication of effort, 
increase collaboration between its personnel, and better support the resources in 
its people.  In this thesis, we have provided a blueprint for building a successful 
unclassified Community of Practice for Naval Intelligence.  This blueprint is 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
With the end of the Cold War the United States Intelligence Community 
(USIC) has been forced to expand its analytical  reach to counter a wide variety 
of emerging threats.  With increasing frequency the United States military is 
finding itself involved in smaller regional conflicts and pursuing terrorist groups 
across the globe.  Intelligence officers are used to dealing with only fragmentary 
evidence and now are being further hamstrung by limited analytical depth and 
experience in these remote regions.  Additionally the USIC has grown so large 
and the amount of raw intelligence data has proliferated considerably that even 
when enough evidence is made available to discern the enemy’s intentions the 
information may be so dispersed that it is impossible to create an accurate 
assessment.  Without a significant change in the way the USIC does business, 
the United States will become increasingly vulnerable. 
With the end of the dotcom boom, private companies have reduced their 
workforce, requiring them to “do more with less”.  This reduction also left these 
companies faced with a need to transform they way they did business.  
Companies were forced to develop smarter business practices and create more 
efficient workforces.  As a result, many companies turned to the field of 
knowledge management and specifically communities of practice to help identify 
best practices as well as the experts within their own organizations.  These same 
principles can be applied to the intelligence community to increase analyst 
collaboration and capabilities.     
Navy1630.com, a community of practice software tool, has been 
developed to provide naval intelligence officers with an online community space 
to foster collaboration and to improve their ability to support the Warfighter.  This 
unclassified community of practice represents the first component  of  a three-
phase process to integrate Communities of Practice into the naval intelligence 
community and to serve as a model for the entire USIC.  During the initial phase, 
the effort will be focused on helping operationally deployed intelligence officers at 
the unclassified level.  Using CompanyCommand.com, an Army community of 
 xvii
practice, as a blueprint, Navy1630.com incorporates many of the lessons and 
features of their successful community of practice necessary for the growth of an 























Today’s Naval Intelligence Community represents an extensive group of 
organizations and people with vastly varying responsibilities.  We comprise an 
organization that is widely dispersed, with an ever-expanding mission and fewer 
people to accomplish the mission.  Unfortunately, this growth in responsibility 
typically has not included an increase in training or time to learn the additional 
responsibilities.  The intelligence Officer comes into the Navy from one of several 
commissioning sources (e.g., Officer Candidate School, Naval Academy, and 
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC)) and then arrives at the Navy and Marine 
Corps Intelligence Training Center (NMITC) for their initial intelligence training.  
During the approximately six months of training, these new Officers receive basic 
tools of their trade, e.g. briefing skills, baseline knowledge of enemy orders of 
battle, cartography, etc.).  However, upon arrival in the fleet, they quickly learn 
that many more skills are required operate as an effective and competent 
intelligence Officer than what they learned at NMITC.  Many times these 
individuals are the only Intelligence officer in the command and they are 
expected to perform in-depth intelligence analysis as well as be function as a 
division officer, leading young Sailors. The blame cannot be placed solely on the 
school for fully preparing these Officers for duty.  Given the wide variety of 
student backgrounds, newly commissioned ROTC and Naval Academy 
graduates, lateral transfers from other Naval communities, and Officer Candidate 
School graduates who may never have seen the ocean, let alone stepped foot on 
a Naval ship, to ensure that all new students in the Intelligence Officer Basic 
Course start with the same foundation, the NMITC must start each group at a 
very basic level.  The job types that Naval Intelligence Officers must fill further 
complicates the NMITC’s mission.  A comment commonly heard among the 
junior intelligence Officers in the Navy is that “we are a jack of all trades and a 
master of none.”  Recent efforts have been made to prepare newly graduated 
NMITC students better by providing a multi-track training path tailored to their 
first assignments.  Around the midpoint of their training, the students will receive 
their first set of orders.  Near the end of their training at NMITC, they are ‘tracked’ 
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into a training program that focuses on the type of skills they will need for their 
first job.  For example, if an officer received orders an F/A-18 Hornet squadron, 
their training during the last weeks of school would include strike support, 
mission planning, cyclic operations (flight operations) briefing, and mission 
debriefing.  However, this customized training only pertains to their first 
assignment.  Rarely will a Navy Intelligence Officer serve two consecutive tours 
where he or she performs the same job function.  This situation results in the 
Officers learning a new job each time they transfer.  If the NMITC were going to 
prepare its young Officers for every potential job, it would require a training 
period similar to the aviation community where the Officers stay in school for 
almost two years.   
Because we cannot afford either the cost or time associated with a two-
year training cycle, the Naval intelligence community uses alternative methods 
for Intelligence Officers to hone their knowledge of the profession.  In the case of 
first-term sea-going Intelligence Officers in squadrons and on ships, the most 
common way they learn is ‘on-the-job’ or in many cases ‘trial by fire’.  While on–
the-job training can supply an effective method for learning many jobs, in most 
cases an intelligence Officer does not enjoy the luxury of re-learning the lessons 
of their predecessors.  Re-learning takes time and given the nature of the job, 
time could cost lives, not to mention the wasted efforts that may have been used 
elsewhere to improve their analytical ability.   
Historians typically cite the development of arts and leisure as a 
benchmark for defining a civilization.  Emergence of art and leisure indicate that 
the members of the civilization have fulfilled their basic needs of food and shelter 
to the point where they possess free time.  In the same manner, an intelligence 
analyst needs to accomplish his or her most basic tasks before they can reach a 
point where they are performing true analysis.  Today’s intelligence community is 
so overburdened with daily tasks, summary reports, and the like that an 
untrained Officer can spend his or her entire day just trying to fulfill these basic 
requirements.   
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The Navy has begun to embrace knowledge management and is investing 
heavily in the related technologies and programs. [DoN CIO, 2001]  The key 
element of knowledge management is the Community of Practice [Wenger, 
2002].  In short, Communities of Practice are collaborative groups of like-minded 
people focused on furthering their knowledge and proficiency in a specific area.  
The current focus of knowledge management projects in the intelligence 
community is limited to connecting its members to the vast amounts of available 
intelligence information.  This type of knowledge management project is essential 
to improving the Naval Intelligence community’s ability to access and utilize 
intelligence information.  Unfortunately, too little focus has been directed on 
connecting the people throughout the Naval Intelligence Community.   
To realize the full benefits of knowledge management a balance must be 
struck between the two types of connections.  By only connecting people to 
information you create static databases and web portals. Focusing only on 
people to people connections and you create chat rooms and bulletin boards.  
Separately these connections provide some limited benefits for the users. 
However, making both connections in the same environment begins to build 
virtual Communities of Practice in which the whole becomes greater than the 
sum of the parts.  By affording people the ability to find information and then by 
allowing them to collaborate within that same information set, a community can 
begin to create and share knowledge.   
The focus of this thesis is creating a Community of Practice for Naval 
intelligence Officers.  By designing, implementing and evaluating this element of 
knowledge management, the Naval Intelligence community can significantly 
reduce the time and effort required to get a sea going intelligence Officer ‘up to 
speed.’  By employing Communities of Practice as a tool to augment their 
learning, intelligence Officers will better use the time they are operationally 
deployed to learn what really matters: the analysis of intelligence information and 
technical proficiency that supports operational missions.  In this thesis  
Communities of Practice are not  viewed as a cure-all for the Naval Intelligence 
community, but for a community whose primary asset is knowledge, providing 
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better ways to capture, disseminate and utilize that knowledge will enhance the 
community overall. 
This thesis will first examine how the intelligence community currently 
collaborates and exchanges information.  The case study method is used to 
examine historical successes where collaboration has proven effective in 
enhancing the mission of Naval Intelligence Officers. Next, the background, 
history, and definitions of knowledge management and Communities of Practice 
and outlined and discussed.  Following this discussion, five implementations of 
Communities of Practice, covering the commercial, corporate, and military 
sectors are reviewed.  These different examples provide a varied illustration of 
how versatile and powerful Communities of Practice can become.  The individual 
communities are examined, providing a description of their target audience, as 
well as what benefits their use has brought to the members of these 
communities.   
As part of this thesis, a prototype Community of Practice for Navy 
Intelligence Officers, accessible on the World Wide Web, is detailed.  The initial 
focus of the community will support sea-going intelligence Officers.  This pilot 
implementation will test the feasibility and demonstrate the applicability of 
communities of practice to the Naval Intelligence Community. Reliance will be 
placed on those members who have been at sea or are currently at sea to 
mentor those who are preparing to deploy.  It is argued that this community will 
become indispensable to sea-going intelligence Officers.  In the final two sections 
of this thesis a roadmap will be drawn for arriving at this position, a plan to 
proceed to make our community of practice flourish will be articulated, and 
recommendations will be made for the future of Communities of Practice in Naval 
Intelligence.   
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II. THE PROBLEM 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of September 11th, the United States Intelligence Community 
has been placed under a microscope.  The media, the Congress, and the 
American public are all searching for answers.  How could arguably the world’s 
best intelligence organizations fail to identify the signs of such a well-
orchestrated attack?  More importantly, what steps are being taken to ensure that 
a similar attack can never happen again?  This occurrence is not the first time the 
intelligence community has been placed under such scrutiny.  Similar questions 
were asked after Pearl Harbor, after the attack on the USS COLE, and after the 
embassy bombings in Africa.  Many of the inquiries held after these incidents 
were able to identify several indicators that, in hindsight, seemed obvious and 
should have allowed analysts to predict the enemy’s course of action.  Of course, 
those looking for clues after the fact hold a distinct advantage.  No longer are 
they trying to find a needle in the haystack.  A few simple searches for keywords 
can provide a very short list of potential indicators.  What may have contained a 
database of several million messages is suddenly reduced to just a handful of 
critical data points; data points which, if they had been identified earlier, would 
have allowed intelligence analysts to provide adequate warning.  While the 
intelligence community never assumes the advantage of hindsight, it cannot be 
used an excuse for failure.  It is the intelligence community’s mission to find 
those critical data points among the millions of others and provide the national 
decision makers and military commanders with sufficient warning. 
Most of the modern intelligence failures have not resulted from collection 
shortfalls but the direct result of analytical limitations within the Intelligence 
Community.  The clues existed, just spread out through the intelligence 
community so widely that no single person or even single agency collated 
enough data to produce an assessment.  The September 11th attacks offer an 
example how the intelligence ‘community’ can fail even though enough 
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information was available. It was too dispersed across the entire community to 
provide adequate threat warning.  In 1994, French authorities foiled a plot by the 
Algerian Armed Islamic Group to fly an airliner into the Eiffel Tower, an event that 
was well known among anti-terrorism analysts.  A year later in the Philippines, 
authorities were able to uncover a plan for mass hijackings of American planes 
over the Pacific.  At the center of this plot was Ramzi Yousef, one of those 
behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.  Additional evidence was 
uncovered during this investigation of a plan to crash a plane into CIA 
headquarters.  With these events serving as the background information, the first 
bits of evidence related to the 9/11 attacks began to come into federal agencies.  
During the early part of the 2001, a flight school in Arizona contacted the Federal 
Aviation Administration.  They were concerned about a Saudi student who spoke 
little English, a requirement for civil aviation, and wanted to learn how to fly 
commercial airliners.  This report was followed in July 2001 when an Arizona FBI 
agent, who had worked on an FBI anti-terrorism task force for 11 years, wrote a 
memo in which he recommended that the FBI begin an investigation to determine 
whether al-Qaeda operatives were training at flight schools within the United 
States.  His recommendation was based his investigative work in which he 
noticed a pattern of Arab men signing up at various flight schools in the 
southwest.  [Elliot, 2002] 
In August 2001, one month before the attacks, the U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) detained Zacarias Moussaoui; a man the French government 
said was linked to Islamic extremists groups.  Moussaoui was arrested just a day 
after the staff at the Minneapolis based flight school where he was training raised 
concerns about him to the local FBI field office.  Moussaoui’s instructor grew 
suspicious when it was evident that Moussaoui lacked any basic flight skills but 
was still willing to pay the $19,000 for a simulator-based course on the 747 
jumbo jet.  After his arrest, agents in Minneapolis sought a national security 
warrant to search Moussaoui’s computer files but were turned down by lawyers 
at FBI headquarters for lack of evidence that he belonged to a terrorist group.  
[Gordon, 2003]  In addition, during the month of August, the Central Intelligence 
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Agency notified the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to prohibit 
Khalid Al-Midhar and Nawaf Al-Hamzi from entering the United Stated based on 
their connection with the Al Qaeda terrorist group.  The INS responded by stating 
that the two individuals had already entered the country and subsequent bench 
warrants were issued for their arrest.  In the few weeks before the hijackings Al-
Midhar and Al-Hamzi purchased airline tickets for their 9/11 flights using their real 
names.  Unfortunately before 9/11, no attempt was made to cross-reference 
between airline reservation databases and the various government agency watch 
lists.  Over the next few days, the remainder of the 9/11 conspirators purchased 
their tickets, several of them using the same address and phone numbers as Al-
Midhar and Al-Hamzi.  [Jonas, 2003] 
Given that the agencies involved could not access airline reservation data, 
it may still have been impossible to predict the specific time and place of the 9/11 
attacks.  However, data existed to indicate an increased threat to commercial 
airliners and their potential use as weapons.  The troubling issue concerns the 
fact that agents in Minnesota were never made aware of the memo from Arizona, 
and the White House Counter-terrorism team was never advised of either the 
arrest or the memo.  As a result, no one collected or connected enough clues to 
identify the threat in time.   Representative Saxby Chamblis, chairman of the 
Select Intelligence Terrorism and Homeland Security Subcommittee, 
summarized it as “those charged with connecting the dots on terrorism do not 
always get the dots.”   Because of the various congressional hearings and 
investigations, the intelligence community has pledged to increase their 
information sharing between the agencies and within the agencies themselves.  
[Elliot, 2002] 
Yet, increased information sharing should not serve as the only goal.  
Analysts are already overwhelmed by the amount of information available.  
Simply opening the information flow more widely between the various agencies 
will only further complicate this situation.  Over the next few years agencies will 
be extremely proactive ensuring that they share all of the data with other 
agencies.  While the desired outcome is to ensure that all of the key decision 
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makers are presented with an accurate and comprehensive picture of the 
situation, the initial effect will further increase the information overload already 
being experienced by analysts.  The real goal should be set to foster and 
facilitate collaboration at the analyst level.  A very significant difference exists 
between increasing the dissemination of the raw intelligence or even finished 
intelligence products and increasing the amount of analyst-to-analyst exchange.  
Instead of just pushing data around, analyst exchanges allow individuals to 
discuss the context surrounding information and to bring their various 
experiences and ‘corporate’ knowledge to bear on the problem.  However, as 
most analysts know, collaboration within the United States Intelligence 
Community does not come easy.   
A 1999 study, sponsored by the DCI's Community Management Staff, the 
Executive Agent of the Community Operational Definition of the Agile Intelligence 
Enterprise (CODA), and the National Intelligence Production Board, was 
commissioned to examine policy, procedural, and cultural barriers to 
collaboration within the Intelligence Community.  The study evaluated how 
collaboration took place among the Central Intelligence Agency, National 
Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Imagery and Mapping 
Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Energy, and the 
Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.  Interviews 
conducted with senior intelligence executives identified several cultural issues 
that have dissuaded agency collaboration.  Among the top reasons given were 
lack of common goals for collaboration across the community, lack of trust 
between organizations and individuals, perceived lack of security in computer 
systems and databases, perceived lack of benefit from collaboration efforts, and 
inadequate reward systems to support collaboration.  (Hall, MITRE)  The report 
concluded that United States Intelligence Community is not designed to facilitate 
collaboration among agencies or even analysts within the same agency.  So why 
does the intelligence community experience such difficulty collaborating?  .  
Before examining the factors that are limiting collaboration and thereby leaving 
the country and its deployed military vulnerable, it may be best to examine an 
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historical example of a successful intelligence organization that not only 
collaborated well, but did so during one of the most trying times in American 
history.   
 
B. STATION HYPO: A SUCCESS STORY 
During the Second World War Hawaii was home to a majority of the 
United States Pacific Fleet as well as to a small group of intelligence analysts 
and cryptanalysts working in a windowless vault known only as Station HYPO.  
Station HYPO fell under the direct command of Commander Joseph Rochefort, a 
Naval cryptologist.  Rochefort worked with Commander Edwin Layton, who 
served as the senior intelligence Officer on Admiral Chester Nimitz’s staff.  The 
analysts at Station HYPO were able to crack the Japanese Naval codes and read 
a vast majority of the orders that were being sent to the Japanese Naval forces.  
At its peak during May 1942, Station Hypo analyzed and reported on as many as 
140 decrypted messages per day.  The assessments made using these 
messages were fed directly to the senior decision makers, Nimitz at Pearl 
Harbor, MacArthur in Australia as well the President and Joint Chiefs back in 
Washington.  While the efforts of Station HYPO continuously aided the allies 
defeat the Japanese, nowhere did their efforts produce a greater impact than at 
the Battle of Midway.  Japanese message traffic pointed to an impending attack 
on Midway Island.  Admiral Nimitz, relying on the analysis performed by Layton, 
Rochefort, and the entire staff at Station HYPO, committed all of the operational 
aircraft carriers to the battle.  Defeat here would have left the United States 
vulnerable to Japanese Naval forces all the way to the West Coast.  Seen as an 
extremely risky decision by many, Nimitz placed his faith in the intelligence 
assessments of Station HYPO.  In the end, the Station HYPO’s predictions of 
when and from what direction the Japanese attacks would commence were only 
off by five minutes and five degrees.  The resulting counterattack by the 
American carrier planes inflicted such heavy damage to the Japanese carrier 
force and its escorts that the Japanese fleet was forced to withdraw from the 
central Pacific. This event served as the turning point for the war in the Pacific.  
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The most significant individual success factor was the timely and accurate 
support provided by Rochefort and his unit supporting the Battle of Midway.  
[NSA.gov, 2003] 
A number of factors contributed to the success of Station HYPO.  The 
most obvious, the breaking of the enemy’s codes, allowed the analysts to read 
the orders being sent to Japan’s deployed Naval forces.  However, cracking the 
Naval codes did not equate to access to all Japanese encrypted 
communications.  The Japanese used many channels to relay orders and 
regularly changed the cryptologic keys to encrypt the messages.  The cryptologic 
key changes required the analysts at HYPO to perform traffic analysis and 
eventually uncover the new key sequence.  Station HYPO relied on two distinct 
non-technical advantages; its small size and its very focused mission.  With the 
analysts all collocated in Hawaii, collaboration was made relatively simple.  The 
volume of messages, even at its peak of 140 per day, represented a manageable 
volume such that all of the analysts were able to read every message.  [Potter, 
1976]  Discussing different theories of enemy intentions and constructing a 
comprehensive assessment of the situation could be done on a face-to-face 
basis.  The analysts knew each other and their respective strengths and 
weaknesses.   
Even with the smoke still rising above Pearl Harbor, the analysts at Station 
HYPO knew that their ability to perform their mission could significantly influence 
the outcome of the war.  At the time, the United States was operating on the 
defensive with a numerically inferior force.  Providing timely intelligence and 
advanced warning was seen as the only way the United States could hope to 
even the odds and hold on long enough to reinforce the nearly crippled Pacific 
Fleet.  Commander Rochefort was not afraid to perform predictive analysis.  
Committing the entire remaining US carrier force based on intelligence 
predictions from Station HYPO represented an extremely risky venture.  If 
Rochefort erred it could have lead to the defeat of US forces in the Pacific.  The 
analysts were not concerned about receiving credit for their work or dreaming 
about being promoted.  In fact, when Admiral Nimitz submitted an award for 
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Commander Rochefort based on his efforts leading up to Midway, it was denied.  
The Secretary of the Navy provided a very simple explanation of why he did not 
think a medal was warranted; Rochefort had simply been doing his job.  [Potter, 
1976]  In completing their mission, Station HYPO responded to a very clearly 
defined audience, the senior decision makers in the Pacific.  Should a question 
ever surface about a particular assessment, the decision makers relied only upon 
a single point of contact to request clarification.  This close relationship also 
allowed the analysts at HYPO to learn what most interested their target 
audience.  They were able to focus their efforts sharply in line with the developed 
campaign plan and based on feedback from the senior leadership shift focus to 
the most critical tasks.  Another facet about Station HYPO also contributed to its 
success.  The country was engaged at war.  A significant portion of the 
administrative requirements and routine tasks were streamlined.  The analysts 
were able to see the direct impact their efforts were making on the war.  Not that 
war is the desired climate, but there are some advantages that cannot be 
replicated during peacetime.  [www.history.navy.mil, 2003]  
 
C. TODAY’S INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY   
Unfortunately, replicating the success of Station HYPO remains extremely 
difficult in today’s Naval Intelligence community.  HYPO’s access to the enemy’s 
communications was unprecedented.  In today’s technologically advanced world, 
encrypted communications have become increasingly available to both 
governments and individuals.  While it may be easier to protect communications 
and data, today’s technology has also produced new ways to gather intelligence 
information from open source methods, like the little known newspaper published 
online in the target country, to the technological advances that allow large-scale 
collection of enemy information.  The resulting volume of potential intelligence 
information is overwhelming.  Information overload is occurring everyday.  Even if 
the fourteen member organizations of the United States Intelligence Community 
(USIC) [www.Intelligence.gov, 2003] dedicated a small group of individuals to 
focus on a particular topic it would be physically impossible to read all of the 
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messages and reports that may relate in some way to their topic of interest.  
Given the amount of data being collected everyday by intelligence agencies it 
may not be necessary for our adversaries to go to great lengths to secure their 
communications. Indeed these adversaries may be able to hide critical 
information and messages in plain sight.  This massive inflow of information only 
further increases the burden on today’s intelligence analysts ability to identify the 
critical pieces of intelligence information.  
In an attempt to keep up with the amount of information, the USIC has 
grown.  The current USIC is comprised of fourteen different organizations.  Each 
of these conducts its own analysis and provides finished intelligence products to 
everyone from the President to our allies to the individual pilot sitting in the 
cockpit of a military aircraft.  The organizations themselves are complex entities 
with thousands of personnel.  Every year each one must compete for funding and 
justify its staffing levels.  The success of these individual organizations is usually 
measured by the amount of intelligence products generated and the value of 
those products to the customers.  Unfortunately, many times it appears that the 
volume of production is more heavily weighted in the equation than the value to 
the customer.  This skewed standard requires that an organization provide a 
continuous stream of original and timely products.  Just as news reporters are 
concerned that a big story might be ‘scooped’ by a competitor, so the various 
intelligence agencies are concerned that if intelligence organizations share at the 
early stages of their analysis with other agencies then a chance exists that 
someone else may release a report and receive the credit, thereby mitigating 
cross-organization cooperation.  This culture extends even further down to the 
individual analyst level within each of the organizations.  Just as the agencies 
receive credit by being the first to release a product, the analysts within these 
organizations are acclaimed for being the first to supply their superiors with new 
information and assessments.  The quickest way to advance is to be seen as the 
person with all of the answers.  This pressure to report first can result in analysts 
even within the same organization keeping valuable information away from their 
fellow analysts.  [www.intelligence.gov] 
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 D. INFORMATION DISPERSION 
By its very nature, intelligence analysis presents a unique challenge.  This 
challenge partially results from a combination of vast amounts of collected 
information combined with a smaller than required workforce exacerbated by all 
of the non-intelligence related administrative work that Intelligence personnel are 
required to perform, requiring them to find shortcuts to get through the 
information.    While every effort is made to review all information collected, 
significant portions are filtered out and only the most obvious pieces of 
information are harvested.  It resembles the ‘low hanging fruit’ analogy.  The 
over-tasked intelligence professional tends to stop searching after they find the 
easy to identify pieces of intelligence.  After an initial filtering, data is prioritized 
based on the organizations intelligence production requirements and analysis 
conducted on the highest priority information.  The vast majority of the data never 
receives any in-depth analysis.   
Despite all of the available information, analysts are forced to work with 
only with fragmentary evidence.  They must use these brief glimpses into the 
adversary’s activities in an attempt to construct a comprehensive assessment of 
the situation and thereby discern an enemy’s course of action or intentions.  It 
can be compared to putting together a 1,000-piece puzzle with only a handful of 
the pieces, and then based on what the puzzle would look like completed, trying 
to determine what the creator of the puzzle was thinking while it was being 
created. Then based on their assessed frame of mind they try to predict what 
types of puzzles may be produced in the future and when they might be created.  
With such a large intelligence community, several individual agencies may 
receive multiple ‘pieces of the puzzle.’  Yet without sharing and collaborating with 
other agencies, no single agency will ever fully understand the overall picture.  
The combination of the immense volume of collected data and numerous 
analytical centers has created its own unique problem, information dispersion.  
The United States Intelligence Community has grown so large that even when 
enough data have been collected to allow accurate prediction of the enemy’s 
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intentions, the individual pieces of data may be so strewn over the entire 
intelligence community that none of the analysts feel that they have collected and 
synthesized enough evidence to make a definitive call.  This information 
dispersion can prove very costly for both the immediate situation and for the long 
term credibility of the United States Intelligence Community, when it is later 
determined, usually during congressional hearings, that enough data had been 
collected to predict the enemy’s action.  What may seem to an analyst at one 
particular organization as a series of seemingly unrelated events may be the 
missing pieces required for another analyst to complete the picture.  These 
organizations may all bring slightly different perspectives and prior experiences 
to the task, which leads them to draw different conclusions from the available 
information.  To handicap oneself by limiting the amount of interaction with other 
analysts, for fear of being scooped, can result in very limited and biased 
assessment. 
 
E. ANALYTICAL DISPERSION 
With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the 
mission of the United States Intelligence Community has shifted to covering a 
larger number of real and potential adversaries who are all vying for a seat at the 
table of world power. This re-focus of intelligence assets has led to the 
intelligence mission becoming extremely complicated and fragmented.  Just as 
the Second World War provided Station HYPO with a clearly defined mission, the 
Cold War allowed the country to focus a majority of its intelligence resources on 
primarily just one adversary.  Today’s analytical effort is much more diffuse.  
While there are clearly defined ‘strategic competitors’ that will remain a priority, 
the intelligence community constantly must respond to crises in regions and 
countries that were previously thought below the threshold for intelligence 
reporting.  For example, in 1999  Australia and the United States formed the core 
of a multinational force that was sent to help the newly independent country of 
East Timor transition to a democratic state.  While East Timor had formed part of 
Indonesia, a country that the USIC and especially the Australian intelligence 
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agencies had monitored for years, it was extremely difficult to find any East Timor 
experts or even someone who spoke the native dialect.  The same thing 
happened in the days following the 9/11 attacks as the USIC scrambled to find 
experts on Afghanistan.  Until then, Afghanistan was positioned extremely low on 
the priority list.  Osama Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda organization had always 
been listed as a priority but when the mission included taking down the Taliban 
government, which had provided him safe haven, the search began for anyone 
who may have gained experience in Afghanistan.  Most of the resident 
knowledge had been developed during the Soviet occupation, and resided in the 
minds or file cabinets of those analysts who looked at the problem day in and day 
out.  Unfortunately, those analysts retired years ago.  Much of the hard copy 
intelligence was never converted to electronic format and the tacit knowledge 
that they held in their heads retired with them. In most cases, even when the 
individuals are identified they are usually spread over the globe making the 
creation a centralized, co-located intelligence task force with qualified people 
time consuming and expensive.  During crisis periods it is relatively easy to 
reassign these individuals for temporary duty, but the amount of time it takes to 
assemble the experts in one location is a drawback 
During non-crisis periods, it may be impossible to gather all of the experts 
in one location.  Many of the regional commands try to host annual conferences 
that allow analysts from the various intelligence organizations to discuss common 
issues.  Individual analysts use these conferences to make contacts with others 
who have been examining the same issues.  Sometimes they discover analysts 
or even entire organizations that they were previously unaware of.  For example 
for any given ‘strategic competitor’ a group of military intelligence analysts will 
monitor that country at the respective regional intelligence center, a group at the 
Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the State 
Department’s intelligence division.  In addition, analysts at each of the military 
service intelligence agencies (i.e. Office of Naval Intelligence, National Air 
Intelligence Center, and National Ground Intelligence Center) focus their 
respective areas of expertise within the country of interest.  Deployed units may 
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be more focused at the tactical level than anyone else.  These operatives 
possess very limited analytical depth and can find themselves deployed with very 
little advanced warning.  A carrier battle group that may have been conducting 
pre-deployment drills off Hawaii may find itself two weeks later providing support 
to a small operation such as East Timor.  The battle group is going to want to 
know a lot about the normal operating patterns of the other military forces within 
the region; information which up to that point may have been below the interest 
threshold for the USIC.   
While it may seem wise to invest at least some analytical effort on every 
country in the world, it would be impossible to justify the staffing requirements 
except for those rare occasions where a previously unknown part of the world 
suddenly appears on the front page of the morning paper.  The President’s 
declaration to hunt down terrorists worldwide has only further added to the 
diffusion.  While very difficult, the intelligence community must transform itself to 
keep up with the ever-expanding mission.  
F. LOSS OF GRANULARITY  
Military Intelligence organizations also suffered another setback in their 
ability to provide timely critical intelligence support when the Joint Intelligence 
Centers were formed during the late 1990’s.  While concentrating analysts from 
the various services into a handful of regional intelligence centers should have 
led to an increased analytical ability many believe that it has done just the 
opposite.  [Studeman, 2003] Deployed and forward-based units are facing 
threats that appear sometimes literally just on the other side of the fence, e.g. US 
military forces deployed to the Arabian Gulf prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
When newly deployed units enter a threat region, they depend heavily on the 
support from the regional intelligence centers and to a lesser extent  the national 
intelligence agencies.  However, within a few days, or at the outside weeks, the 
units quickly grow less and less dependent on the support of the regional 
intelligence center.  The level of granularity in the various joint intelligence 
products does not meet the needs of the unit.  Just by the very nature of being 
deployed to a threat region a unit’s organic intelligence support, while only 
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forming a fraction of the size of a joint intelligence center, quickly outperforms the 
rear echelon support.  Though the support of deployed forces stays high on the 
list of priorities at most Joint Intelligence Centers, unless it is a time of war, 
support of the Theater Commander (formerly CINC) tends to take precedence.  
By focusing its support to the Commander level, the theater intelligence 
organization loses the granularity that deployed units need.  
Joint intelligence centers keep a 24-hour watch in place to try to satisfy 
around-the-clock intelligence requirements.  However, an overwhelming majority 
of the watch standers are newly arrived personnel.  The real analytical depth 
resides in the ‘day shops’, which work during normal business hours.  Even then, 
bureaucratic processes further complicate the analysis.  The chain of command, 
and for analytical products, the chain of release, is not strictly motivated by the 
facts, but takes into account other factors whether political or organizational.  
These secondary factors tend to ‘mellow’ analysts predictions and assessments.  
While it is understandable and possibly inevitable that senior leadership will seek 
to temper the assessments of their respective intelligence centers for fear of 
being accused of ‘crying wolf’, it can exert a very negative effect on future 
analytical rigor.  Analysts become dissuaded from making calls for which they are 
not highly certain will be correct.  They become equivalent to news reporters 
reporting events of the previous day or politicians failing to take a position on 
either side of what might happen, leaving himself or herself plausible deniability 
regardless of the outcome.  The process has grown so ingrained that today 
hardly any predictive analysis is forthcoming.  Most of the intelligence reporting is 
nothing more than a journalistic rehash of the previous day’s activities.  
[Studeman, 2003] 
The performance and therefore the careers of analysts are rated on their 
ability to support their command’s mission.  While the overall mission of the 
United States Intelligence Community is to protect America, how each of the 
different intelligence organizations supports that mission varies widely.  The 
regional military intelligence centers are placed in a difficult position.  The various 
service organizations that were combined to form them had previously been 
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supporting their deployed service units.  Now those units turn to the regional 
centers.  At the same time the theater commanders and their staffs rely on the 
centers for their intelligence production as well.  Unfortunately, the deployed units 
want tactical level details and predictive analysis, while the theater commanders 
want strategic level assessments.  As previously discussed, the analysts are 
already suffering from information overload and are stretched too thinly to 
provide two levels of analysis.  While these regional centers usually include 
‘supporting the Warfighter’ in their mission statements, many spend a 
disproportionately large amount of their effort directly supporting the theater 
commanders.  It is not difficult to see why; the theater commander is a four-star 
admiral or general with a one-star intelligence Officer, while most of the deployed 
units are commanded by on O-5 or O-6, with an even more junior Intelligence 
Officer.  Members of the joint intelligence centers, especially junior analysts, are 
not going to advance if they develop a reputation for telling a four star admiral to 
wait.  
G. LESSONS LEARNED 
In the military, the concept of ‘lessons learned’ represents a formal 
method for passing on what worked and did not work for a particular unit.  The 
idea suggests that units that might perform the same mission later will not need 
to make the same mistakes; they simply read and integrate the lessons learned 
reports.  Theoretically, by building on the lessons learned, each unit should be 
more successful than the previous one. Unfortunately, lessons learned remain 
largely ineffective.   
The incidents and lessons themselves must be captured by a member of 
the unit and then submitted up the chain of command.  The unit commanders 
then review the lessons and determine which ones will be included in the overall 
lessons learned message to other units.  A certain amount of self-censorship 
takes place during this process.  When units identify mistakes that, in hindsight, 
seem obvious and preventable, they may not want to admit it to the rest of the 
military.  Additionally unit commanders may not feel that some of the lessons 
from the junior members merit critical attention to include in the overall lessons 
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learned.  That is not to say that there is not some benefit in the final product, but 
to realize the benefit future units must undertake one very important 
responsibility; they must read and implement the lessons learned.  While the 
senior members of a unit make a point of reviewing the lessons learned 
available, more junior members may not. The reason is two-fold: first, they may 
not be aware of the availability of the lessons learned, and second, they may find 
them useless because they are unable to contact the people who wrote them to 
follow up their questions.  In the Naval Intelligence community, we get 
significantly smaller at higher ranks.  As a result, the more senior you are, the 
more likely you will know a much larger percentage of your peers as well as 
know how to get in touch with them.  This ability allows the senior members of 
the community to converse regularly to compare and discuss lessons learned.  In 
the junior ranks of the Naval Intelligence community, the sheer number of 
personnel make it less likely that a deploying junior Officer will know the 
individuals on the other end of the latest lesson learned, much less how to get in 
touch with them.  Though the Officers who wrote the lesson learned would 
usually provide point of contact information in the lesson learned, it is unlikely 
that they will be available at that contact point for more than a few months. In 
short, the lessons themselves are static documents that may not include all of the 
required background information pertinent to the situation.  Though there is a 
general format and template for these lessons learned, rarely are all questions of 
future consumers answered in the lesson, as to do so would take an inordinate 
amount of time.  As units are deployed all over the world, the amount of face-to-
face turnover between units is quickly diminishing.  In many situations, a unit may 
deploy to a region with no one to turn over with. Weeks or even months may 
have elapsed since another unit was present.  The newly arrived units must rely 
only on the lessons learned.  Those before them have most likely returned home 
or rotated to another part of the globe, making it nearly impossible to ask 
questions related to the lessons learned.   
The fact the U.S. military has not experienced a catastrophic intelligence 
failure in the last decade should not serve as validation of the current analytical 
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model.  Most of the intelligence requirements today are being satisfied by a small 
percentage of the analysts who are willing to work overtime and dig and sift 
through mountains of data to answer the simplest of questions, while someone 
else within the intelligence community has likely already answered many of these 
questions.  This wasted time and effort could have been put to better use 
focusing on analysis that moves beyond what the enemy did yesterday allowing 
the Intelligence Officer to predict what will happen tomorrow.  While the 
challenge of working with only fragmentary evidence may never be overcome, 
solutions must be found to ensure collaboration between the right analysts at the 
right time to provide timely and accurate assessments including adequate 
warning to both senior decision makers and the Warfighter alike.   
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The first part of this chapter will present background information on 
Knowledge Management (KM).  The remainder of the chapter will focus on 
Communities of Practice (CoP), “the keystone of effective knowledge strategy” 
[Wenger, 2002] and the primary focus of this thesis.  
KM has existed in some fashion in the US since World War II. [Prusak, 
2001] It was then observers in US aircraft production factories noted that building 
the second airplane of a given type took considerably less time than the first one, 
and the second airplane contained fewer defects than the first.  In other words, it 
was shown that workers really did learn from experience combined with 
documented processes.   In the fifties, the Rand Corporation began to analyze 
and codify observations of this type.  The phenomenon was given its classic 
expression in Nobel Prize-winning economist Kenneth Arrow’s 1962 article, 
“Learning by Doing.”  [Arrow, 1962]  In “Learning by Doing”, experience is 
equivalent to knowledge, but that is not always the case. 
Unfortunately, since the coining of the phrase “Knowledge Management” it 
remains nearly impossible to find a clearly understood and agreed upon 
definition.  Each “expert” in the field offers their own definition, as does each 
purported practitioner of KM.  This difficulty in defining KM has caused the failure 
of many KM initiatives before they ever get off the ground.  To address this 
question, the terms knowledge and management will first be looked at 
independently and then together, providing a working definition from which to 
move forward to a discussion of Communities of Practice. 
 
B. KNOWLEDGE 
• Knowledge is created by people.  It reflects their know-how and involves 
their education, experience, thinking, decision-making, and all other 
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capacities for creating choices and taking action.  Corporate knowledge is 
derived from individuals and may be documented and embedded in 
organizational resources.  Knowledge is more than data and information.  
[FAA Team Technology Center, 2001] 
 
• Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary [http://www.m-w.com] defines 
knowledge as 1 a (1).  The fact or condition of knowing something with 
familiarity gained through experience or association.  (2):  acquaintance 
with or understanding of a science, art or technique b (1): the facto or 
condition of being aware of something (2): the range of one’s information 
or understanding <answered to the best of my knowledge> c: the 
circumstances or condition of apprehending truth or fact through 
reasoning: Cognition d: the fact or condition of having information or of 
being learned <a man of unusual knowledge> 2 a: the sum of what is 
known: the body of truth, principles acquired by mankind; applies to facts 
or ideas acquired by study, investigation, observation or experience. 
 
1. Additional Definitions 
• Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual 
information, and expert insight that provides a framework for 
evaluating and incorporating new experiences and information.  It 
originates and is applied in the minds of the knower.  In 
organizations, it often becomes embedded not only in documents or 
repositories, but also in organizational routines, processes, practices, 
and norms.  [Davenport and Prusak, 1998] 
• Knowledge is about reasoning about information and data to enable 
performance, problem solving, decision making and learning [Tom 
Beckman, IRS, 2002] 
• Knowledge is the human capacity (potential and actual ability) to take 
effective action.  [David Bennet] 
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2. Types of Knowledge 
In most KM circles, knowledge is separated into two different types, 
explicit and tacit.  In broad terms, the difference in the two types of knowledge is 
that explicit knowledge can be written down, stored and managed by information 
systems.  Tacit knowledge is the knowledge that resides in the minds of people.  
While moving the data associated with explicit knowledge may be relatively 
simple, sometimes as simple as the push of a button, tacit knowledge is 
extremely difficult to transfer.  This difficulty exists because we must find ways to 
get the knowledge from the mind of the person into a form that can be 
electronically shared.   Purists argue that tacit knowledge once transformed into 
a more explicit form ceases to be knowledge--that it is only information--and that 
information only becomes knowledge again when comprehended the human 
mind.  [Barth, 2002]  
Data and information comprise the two agreed upon components required 
to create knowledge.  Figure 1 depicts knowledge as part of a hierarchical 
structure built on data and information, suggesting creating knowledge requires 
both data and information. 
 
3. Data 
The term data is derived from the Latin word meaning something given.  It 
contains a specific, limited or discrete bit of communication.  If accurate, it may 
be called a fact.  Data is considered a subset of information that is used for 
analysis.  A single data item carries no meaning and yet can prove essential and 
extremely valuable in the development of information.  Computers easily process 
data.  [FAA Team Technology Center, 2001] 
 
4. Information 
Information is refined data that has been placed in context and given 
meaning.  Information may add value in various other ways such as by qualifying 
or labeling.  Information contains a message that is determined by recipients to 
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be information.  The etymology is complex to form and perhaps to explain.  
Labeling or quantifying data may clarify it so that it provides information.  
Messages attempt to convey information and imply both a sender, either a 
person or automated media, and a receiver who receives the data in a 
meaningful context.  No message is conveyed unless the message is meaningful 







(Information + experience or 
guidance for action)
Wisdom
Knowing how to use 
knowledge
  
Figure 1 Knowledge Hierarchy 
Figure 1 adds two other representations.  The first applies to the wisdom 
block topping the pyramid.  Varying arguments in current literature debate the 
definition of the concept of wisdom. Some use wisdom and knowledge 
interchangeably; others argue a distinct difference between the two, while 
several equate wisdom and ‘understanding’.  For the purposes of this discussion, 
wisdom is treated as being different from knowledge and is defined as the ability 
to take competing and different pieces of knowledge, weigh the short and long-
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term effects, and make a rational decision.  Wisdom, simply stated, allows the 
ability to implement knowledge.   
The second item in Figure 1 shows the arrow looping back to information.  
As knowledge is created, data and information result as positive byproducts.  
Creating knowledge provides new data and information that others can further 
use in the formation of new knowledge.  Current literature provides several 
illustrations of the “cycle of knowledge” with the profound conclusion suggesting 
that data, information and knowledge are not static entities.  As they are used, 
new data, information and knowledge are created. 
 
C. DATA TO KNOWLEDGE – MAKING THE LEAP 
Most people intuitively think they know the difference between data and 
information, but for illustrative purposes the following example to examine the 
two is provided: 
 
Vehicle Type Tanks APC’s HET’s Support Vehicles 
In Garrison 12 10 18 32 
In Training Area 12 13 22 10 
Table 1 Knowledge Example Sample Dataset One 
In the table above, each row is merely a collection of five data points.  
Taken individually one lists vehicle types, the second lists the number of 
something in garrison, and the third counts the number of something in a training 
area.  When taken individually these three data lists are relatively meaningless.  
However, by combining the data from two or more lines together, new 
information may be available.  What information can be gleaned from these data 
sets?  One can determine the type and number of vehicles present in a particular 
garrison as well as the type and number of vehicles in a training area.  No 
additional information is afforded by this data set.  
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Vehicle Type Tanks APC’s HET’s Support Vehicles 
In Garrison 12 10 18 32 
In Training Area 12 13 22 10 
Missing from Garrison 12 14 25 16 
Table 2 Knowledge Example Sample Dataset Two 
By adding another line of data, highlighted in gray, additional information 
is now made available.  Adding the ”missing from garrison” data line allows one 
to determine that vehicles are indeed missing from garrison.  The additional 
information alone does not help locate the missing vehicles but only notes that 
vehicles are missing.  By making several assumptions, it can be shown how the 
analyst can gain knowledge from this data and information.  The first assumption 
is that the analyst maintains an inventory of the vehicles normally at the garrison 
and so can determine whether all vehicles are accounted for.  The second 
assumption suggests the analyst can access some historical data or someone’s 
experience.  The access to this historical experience may be based on personal 
experience or through the experiences of others the analyst regularly contacts.  
When the conditions of these two assumptions are met, the analyst now controls 
the tools to create knowledge.  So armed, the analyst can make judgments about 
the disposition of the vehicles and depending on his historical knowledge of the 
activities of these vehicles, where they might be located and what they might be 
doing. The key, regardless of how the analyst’s assessment turned out, is for the 
analyst to capture the lesson for himself or herself and to pass them along to 
others focused on the same problem 
Moving from information to knowledge represents a big step, one that is 
difficult to complete using only computers, but is instead one best completed in 
the human mind.  Because knowledge is composed of more than data points, 
trends, or information, it combines an accumulation of facts or information that 
holds meaning beyond the facts themselves.  In the human sense, knowledge is 
the understanding of consequences from a group of facts.  These consequences 
can be experienced or deduced, but in either case are known.  [Nicholls, 2000]    
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In the example above, the analyst looking at the data and information 
about the locations and status of a group of military vehicles will rely on 
experiences, other information and intuition to make a determination of the 
location of the missing vehicles.  The analyst may know that during a particular 
time of the year the unit at this particular garrison usually conducts training in the 
field.  When the analyst makes a determination and publishes the results, 
knowledge has been created.  Data and information alone are considered of 
marginal use by themselves, but by fusing the various pieces of information and 
comparing the resultant data sets against a person’s experiences, and their 




• Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary [http://www.m-w.com] defines 
management as:  1: The act or art of managing; the conducting or 
supervising of something.  2:  Judicious use of means to 
accomplish and end.  3: the collective body of those who manage 
or direct an enterprise. 
 
Much like knowledge, management can be described as a hierarchy that 
includes leadership, management, and supervision. 
• Leadership:  Involves dealing with purpose and change at a 
strategic level.   
• Management:  Can be equated to dealing with groups and 
priorities at an operational level.   
• Supervision:  Equates to dealing with individual tasks and people, 
and is conducted at the tactical level of an organization. 
[Wagner and Hollenbeck, 1992] 
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Given the multiple and varying definitions of both knowledge and 
management, it becomes easy to see why a common definition of either term let 
alone the combined terms remains so elusive.  A working definition of Knowledge 
Management, followed by several statements about what KM does not involve is 
provided to set the context for the remaining sections of this thesis.   
Knowledge Management refers to strategies and structures for maximizing 
the return on intellectual and information resources.  Because intellectual capital 
resides both in tacit form (human education, experience and expertise) and 
explicit form (documents and data), KM depends on both cultural and 
technological processes of creation, collection, sharing, recombination, and 
reuse.  The goal is to create new value by improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of individual and collaborative knowledge work while increasing 
innovation and sharpening decision-making.  [Barth, 2002] 
The following statements should help further clarify KM by ruling out 
several commonly misconceived notions about what KM is. 
• Knowledge management is not knowledge 
engineering.  Knowledge engineering has comprised 
a vital part of computer science but is barely even 
related to knowledge management.  Knowledge 
management is a business concept and falls in the 
domain of information systems and management, not 
in computer science.  [Tiwana , 2000] 
 
• Knowledge management is about process, not just 
digital networks.  Management of knowledge has 
to encompass and improve business processes.  
Drucker warns that focusing on the T and not the I 
in IT will deliver little.  [Tiwana , 2000] 
 
• Knowledge management is not about building a 
“smarter” intranet.  A knowledge management 
system can use your intranet as its front end, but 
one should never be mistaken for the other.  
Saying that your intranet is your knowledge 
management system is something as senseless 
as saying a jetliner is the cockpit.  The “just-add-
water” approach traditionally used with packaged 
intranets collapses face down when used for 
knowledge management.  [Tiwana , 2000] 
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• Knowledge management is not about a one-time 
investment.  Knowledge management like any 
other future-oriented investment (i.e. training and 
education) requires consistent attention over a 
substantial period of time even after it begins to 
deliver results.  [Tiwana , 2000]    
 
• Knowledge management is not about enterprise-
wide “Infobahn’s.”  While enterprise integration 
helps, the primary focus of KM is on creating, 
getting, importing, delivering, and most importantly 
helping the right people, apply the right knowledge 
at the right time.  [Tiwana , 2000] 
 
• Knowledge management is not about “capture.”  
Document management vendors suggest 
otherwise, but knowledge management is not 
about capturing “knowledge.”  An inevitable loss of 
context occurs when documents are “sanitized” for 
use across the company.  Knowledge, in its 
entirety, cannot be captured.  [Tiwana , 2000] 
Though the above discussion of KM still leaves questions 
unanswered, it is sufficient to allow movement past the arguments about 
the definition of KM and to the focus of this thesis, Communities of 
Practice (CoP). 
E. COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE (COP) 
The term “Communities of Practice” was first coined by Etienne Wenger 
and Jean Lave in their 1991 book, Situated Learning (Cambridge University 
Press) which was based on work completed in the late 1980’s in part on 
observing and interviewing Quartermasters on U.S. Navy ships.  [Lave and 
Wenger, 1991]  They found that “legitimate peripheral participation” was 
important to learning.  In other words, “shop talk” helps people learn.  Younger or 
less experienced workers learn from older or more experienced workers by a 
gradual increase from “peripheral” to full participation in their job.  [Kimble, 2001]  
As these workers begin to participate, their experience helps them to develop 
“tacit knowledge.”  According to a 2001 study by Deloitte and Touche, an 
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estimated 70 percent of an organization’s knowledge base is tacit or subjective in 
nature and is based on the personal experiences and the context of learning 
events of its members.  [Deloitte Research, 2001]  In this chapter, we will discuss 
the nature and form of Communities of Practice and distinguish among other 
forms of group communication.  A discussion of the different types or levels of a 
Community of Practice along with their benefits and pitfalls will also be covered. 
 
1. What are Communities of Practice (CoPs) 
Communities of Practice involve groups of people who share a concern, a 
set of problems, or a passion about a topic, and who deepen their knowledge 
and expertise in this area by interacting on an ongoing basis.  [Wenger, 
McDermott, and Snyder, 2002]  Although the term “Community of Practice” is 
relatively new, Communities of Practice are not.  These groups have appeared in 
some form since the beginning of humankind.  In the early history of modern man 
when most of the earth’s inhabitants were nomads following the food source, 
young hunters honed their skills by learning from the stories and experiences of 
their more experienced elders or peers and then gradually developing the 
performance skills needed to take game.  They learned the lessons of those who 
had already done it, and from those unsuccessful unfortunates who provided test 
cases without needing to repeat the mistakes.  Circa 1000 AD, the beginnings of 
formal Communities of Practice are evident.  Though not called a Community of 
Practice, the Blacksmiths Guild provides an example of a true Community of 
Practice where members could meet and share best practices within their 
profession.  Communities continued to be formed through history.  In the United 
States, Minutemen during the War for Independence, militias during the War of 
1812, Underground Railroad operatives preceding the Civil War, and the 
Pinkerton detectives during the late nineteenth century, offer additional examples 
of other such similarly constituted communities.  In the modern corporate world, 
similar groups formed since people in organizations realized they could benefit 
from sharing their knowledge, insights, and experiences with others with similar 
interests or goals.  One of the best-known, early examples of a Community of 
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Practice was formed by the copier repair technicians at Xerox Corporation.  
[Brown and Gray, 1995]  Through networking and sharing their experiences, 
particularly the problems they encountered and the solutions they devised, a core 
group of these technicians proved extremely effective in improving the efficiency 
and effectiveness of efforts to diagnose and repair Xerox customers’ copy 
machines.  The impact on customer satisfaction and the business value to Xerox 
was tremendous.  However, for the most part, this cadre formed a voluntary, 
informal gathering and sharing of expertise group, not a “corporate program.”   
Historically the military have devised ways to transfer knowledge to our 
newcomers.  Standard operating procedures (SOP), doctrine, and pass-down 
logs tend to create a culture of community.  With these tools, the military has 
done a commendable job of capturing and transferring explicit knowledge to new 
members.  An example can be found in the military aviation communities Hazard 
Report System (HAZREP).  Through this system, any issue, technical or 
otherwise, that can affect safety of flight is rapidly disseminated throughout the 
entire aviation community and immediately incorporated into training and 
maintenance programs.  Unfortunately, despite technological progress some of 
the military’s most powerful tools for passing explicit knowledge to newcomers 
are being underutilized, resulting in valuable knowledge loss.  
Officers clubs provide a fitting example of a pre-Internet community of 
practice.  In previous years junior Officers gathered at Officers Clubs on a regular 
basis outside the hierarchical rank-based confines of their command to build 
relationships, to trade lessons learned and to be mentored.  Meetings at the O-
club provided an opportunity to learn important lessons from other Officers from 
one’s command as well as those from other organizations, and to participate in 
the free exchange of ideas that helped to improve the community.  The success 
of this community was largely based upon the fact that members did not view 
their interactions at the Officers’ club as work.  
Technology and modern organizational methods have given rise to  the 
creation of a society of cubicle dwellers within organizations.  Before the days of 
chat, email, or the Internet, workers could choose two primary options for 
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interacting with people; they could meet with them face to face or talk directly 
with them on the phone.  Now it is more common for people to avoid this type of 
live social contact.  Many workers today seem to prefer sending an electronic 
message rather than picking up the phone and collaborating or meeting in 
person.   
 For example, in the early 1970’s the Navy photographer  mates and 
photography Officers in the Southern California area would hold quarterly 
gatherings for the whole region to discuss changes in the industry, exchange 
lessons learned, make new contacts and learn more about their community.  
Smaller groups in the Navy photography community met more frequently to 
continue their learning.  [Bonjorni, 2003]  It seems as technology has developed, 
people have chosen not to interact on a personal level, losing one of the most 
valuable learning tools available to an organization. While using impersonal tools 
to communicate offers distinct advantages, like speed of delivery of information 
and disregard for time zone, disadvantages arise also.  The biggest 
disadvantage to this form of communication is that it lacks context and limits the 
ability to interact dynamically. 
  
2. Types of Communities of Practice 
In defining the types of Communities of Practice, it is easier to view them 
as more of a spectrum that compartmentalizing them into specific types.  For this 
discussion, two types of Communities of Practice will be examined.  The self-
organizing Community of Practice is found at one end of the spectrum and the 
sponsored Community of Practice is located at the other.  Successful 
Communities of Practice exist at both ends and many places in between. 
a) Self Organizing 
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Self Organizing Communities of Practice are self-governing as well.  
They pursue the shared interests of the group’s members.  These Communities 
of Practice add value to an organization by sharing lessons learned, acting as 
distribution points for best and emerging practices, providing forums in which 
issues and problems can be raised and resolved and, in general, by learning 
from each other.  They are extremely resilient in that as members come and go 
as interests and issues shift and evolve the community itself remains solvent.  
Over time, then, communities and their members adapt.  They can even evolve 
into a formal or sponsored Community of Practice.  Alternatively, they might 
disband if enough of the members decide they are no longer deriving benefit 
from their membership.  This type of Community of Practice benefits since it can 
continue to exist without the “baggage” or negative stigma brought by association 
of the site with a given organization that can come from organizational 
sponsorship.  In many instances, members will be reluctant to participate in a 
community they believe is being “controlled” by an organization.  When a 
community is spontaneously created or at least without direct organizational 
sponsorship, its members tend to feel more comfortable contributing to the 
growth and success of the community.  Communities of this nature are seen as a 
place to go outside the confines of an organization to get advice, assistance, or 
support from knowledgeable people.  The downside to the self-organizing 
Community of Practice is they can sometime be difficult to organize without a 
“benefactor.”  If the members’ organization sees the participation in Communities 
of Practice by their workers as a waste of time, or threatening to management’s 
control, it may prove difficult for those workers to participate fully and may result 
in a short-lived community.   
b) Sponsored 
Sponsored Communities of Practice are initiated, chartered, and 
supported by the leadership of an organization.  Sponsored Communities of 
Practice are expected to produce measurable results that benefit the 
organization like improved return on investment (ROI).  They secure needed 
resources and they receive more formal roles and responsibilities.  Even so, they 
appear much more self-governing and wide-ranging than the typical working 
group.  The greatest benefit provided to a Community of Practice by 
organizational sponsorship is shown in the support of the organization’s 
leadership.  By sponsoring a Community of Practice, an organization is telling its 
workers that it recognizes the benefit of sharing knowledge within the 
33 
organization and trusts its workers will be better educated and more productive 
because of their participation in that community.  Additionally, gaining official 
sponsorship provides the necessary resources to ensure a community is able to 
survive.  The downside to organizational sponsorship remains the potential 
baggage associated with an organization’s support of a community.  Regardless 
of the organization, some individuals will maintain and offer a negative opinion of 
the organization for some reason or another.  If enough of the potential 
community members share this negative opinion of the sponsoring organization, 
the community will fail.  The other issue affecting organizational sponsorship is 
the possibility for bureaucratic bumbling and interference in the growth and 
operation of the Community of Practice.  Fear by the organizational leadership of 
losing control, resulting in policies placing limits on participation in a given 
community of practice will quickly end the usefulness of said community. 
Figure 2 provides several examples of organizational relationships to 
Communities of Practice with a brief outline of the challenges faced by these 
communities at each level.  It should be noted however, regardless of where on 
the spectrum of community type a community falls, to ensure success it must 
obtain at least tacit support by the organizational leadership.  Additionally the 
leadership must be willing to cede some control and allow the community to 
serve as a place where workers of an organization go for the free exchange of 
ideas and information that support learning, professional growth and innovation.  
For a Community of Practice to succeed in the Naval Intelligence Community, 
support must be forthcoming from the senior leadership.  To garner this support 
we must demonstrate the benefits communities of practice can bring to the 
organization, including providing more efficient learning, increased creativity, 
improved collaboration and an innovative spirit that heretofore has been unseen, 
untapped, and unrealized.   
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Communities of Practice, when properly implemented will allow the Naval 
Intelligence Community to experience a cultural revolution. This revolution will 
result in a shift from the current model of ‘I’ve got a secret’ to one of 
collaboratative professionalism where intelligence professionals recognize the 
value of sharing and embrace collaboration.  In the next chapter, examples of 
other organizations, government and corporate, that have embraced 
Communities of Practice are provided. 
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IV. PROLIFERATION OF COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Even though an industry-wide definition or commonly agreed upon 
standards for Knowledge Management does not exist currently, in the past 
several years some government agencies and industrial firms have begun to 
recognize the value in its practice.  Specifically, they have started to see the 
value in Communities of Practice.  However, as with the adoption of most new 
business practices, industry is far ahead of the government in its adoption and 
support of Communities of Practice.  Certain organizations in the U.S. 
Government are attempting to catch up to industry in this field. In fact, some like 
the US Army are leading the way with CompanyCommand.com and 
PlatoonLeader.org, two communities of practice which will be discussed in this 
chapter.  When it comes to knowledge management initiatives, most 
organizations start by connecting people to static information within the 
organization.  In the Navy, this static information is generally organizational in 
nature and contained in documented policies, procedures, instructions in varying 
forms including, emails, PowerPoint presentations, and record message traffic.  
The Navy has undertaken several initiatives that help to connect its people to 
organizational information, the largest of which is Task Force Web, the Navy’s 
organizational portal.  [www.tfw.navy.mil, 2003] Individual communities in the 
Navy also have begun their own similar initiatives.  This strategy is adequate as a 
first step, but it must not end there, especially in an organization whose people 
are perceived as their greatest assets.  The Navy as a whole and individual 
communities within the Navy need to focus more on connecting its key 
performers, allowing them to learn from and with each other.   
The future is coming faster than we are adapting to it.  Organizations are 
straining from the impact of increasingly complex work at all levels of the modern 
knowledge organization.  Two key indicators of the slow rate of adaptation 
include large increases in the number of employees who are reporting they feel 
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overworked and the reporting of the significant amounts of time employees are 
spending looking for what they need to make decisions.  [Price Waterhouse 
Coopers, 2000]  Recognizing this adoption delay, many software vendors seeing 
new markets have seized the idea of facilitating knowledge sharing with software 
that links people together and to the static or organizational information.  Orbital 
Software, and Tacit Knowledge Systems [Wenger, 2002] are two examples of 
such companies, offering software that allows one person in search of advice or 
expertise to locate another person, typically by asking a question and either 
accessing a database of existing answers or waiting for an ‘expert’ to respond.  
Other companies such as Communispace, and Tomoye Inc. [Wenger, 2002] 
provide tools that focus on building Communities of Practice.   
One way to evaluate this type of technology is to consider a virtual version 
of the Officers Clubs, where members are able to go and interact in cyberspace 
with others in their field to trade best practices and discuss what works and what 
does not.  By regular interaction among members of the group, certain members 
become the recognized expert.  This interaction creates opportunity for learning, 
professional growth and serves as a catalyst for building personal and 
professional networks.  We are not suggesting that the patrons of the Officers 
Clubs were completing large amounts of work, but the connections to others in 
the community that were made at the Club were invaluable to the junior Officers 
learning the profession.  We support this argument with personal experiences 
over the last ten years.  On  almost every occasion we have been a part of a 
group of Intelligence Officers getting together outside of work, the conversation 
inevitably turns to work:  what works within our community,  what is broken, and 
how can we fix it. 
Some in the Intelligence community today argue that they do not need or 
want a technological tool to do what they can do in person.  Unfortunately, in the 
business of intelligence in the Navy, the opportunity to head down to the local 
Officers Club and grow the personal networks that allow us to get those 
questions answered does not exist.  In the past decade, many Officers Clubs in 
the Navy have practically been abandoned, falling victim to changes in the 
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political and social environment.  Additionally a majority of Navy Intelligence 
assignments are listed as ‘one of one’ jobs with few if any other Intelligence 
Officers co-located.  The death of the Officers Clubs and the dispersed nature of 
our assignments make physically interacting with others in our field difficult, if not 
impossible. 
It is not suggested that these tools can take the place of dynamic face-to-
face interaction, but in the work environment today, they provide a mechanism to 
bridge the gaps and in some cases enhance the learning and recreate some of 
the associated benefits that came from the personal interaction at the Officers 
club.  Yet, more than just implementing software solutions is required to make 
these tools successful.  As previously stated, a cultural revolution in the 
Intelligence Community must occur allowing these tools to pay dividends.  In 
order for people to employ these tools and make them productive and 
successful, participants must believe that when collaborating in electronic 
Communities of Practice, they will not be wasting their time.  It means those who 
participate, especially those in search of information, must receive relevant 
answers and information in a timely manner.  Additionally, experts must be 
motivated to share their knowledge and do so in ways that are helpful to the 
community.   
As stated in Chapter 3, the model of ‘I’ve got a secret’ must be shattered.  
With the culture in the Intelligence Community being portrayed as one of secrecy, 
members are generally reluctant to share what they know.  Unfortunately, this 
behavior carries over to other areas like professional development, where 
secrecy tends to be counterproductive.  This hesitance creates a hurdle for a 
successful Community of Practice to overcome.  However, as with the personal 
face-to-face networks that once flourished in the Officers Clubs around the world, 
in most Communities of Practice, many experts only need peer recognition as an 
incentive for their continued participation.  Whether driven by the ego or a true 
desire to support the community, as individuals in the community are noted and 
ranked by their peer group for providing relevant, useful information, they 
become the recognized expert and their incentive to continue participation grows. 
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An example of this willingness to participate is demonstrated at Clearly 
Business, a London-based portal aimed at small businesses.  [Santosus, 2002]  
Using software from Orbital, Clearly Business provides a forum where 105,000 
registered users seek advice from experts and share ideas.  According to the 
company, the willingness among the site's experts to help others who are 
challenged by running a business is reinforced by a rating system, which allows 
users to recognize those experts who provide the most relevant, useful answers.  
Experts get no other incentive to share what they know, and Clearly Business 
asserts that they don't need anything else.  [Santosus, 2002]  The key to getting 
the most out of Community of Practice tools is to deploy them for use by a 
community of like-minded individuals.  Getting those people to share what they 
know can be as easy as recognizing them as the “go-to” person. 
In the remainder of this chapter, implementations of communities of 
practice in the commercial space, government, and industry will be examined 
followed by a discussion of the basic requirements for fostering successful 
Communities of Practice. 
 
B. COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE IN ACTION 
In this thesis, five institutions have been selected as examples of 
successful communities of practice.  The first one at Xerox was chosen because 
it was one of the first documented Communities of Practice in the corporate 
sector. [Brown and Gray, 1995]  The second firm resides in the commercial 
sector and actually runs as a for-profit Community of Practice.  The third 
Community of Practice is found at Royal Dutch Shell.  The success of this 
Community of Practice has been well documented.  It serves as an excellent 
example of how organizations can benefit from the use of communities of 
practice.  The final two communities of practice are military in nature.  The first, 
Program Management Community of Practice (PMCoP), was created to serve 
the Department of Defense program management personnel.  The final 
community, CompanyCommand.com, was created by several junior Officers with 
a focus on improving Officer leadership at the US Army Company level.   
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1. Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) 
One of the most well-known and documented Community of Practice was 
discovered at Xerox in the 1980’s.  The management at Xerox was seeking a 
way to boost the productivity levels of its field service staff.  As most corporate 
and bureaucratic institutions do, they commissioned a study before making a 
decision.  An anthropologist from the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC), 
a member of the work-practices team, traveled with a group of technical 
representatives to observe how they actually performed their jobs -- not how they 
described what they did, or what their managers assumed they did.  That 
research challenged the way Xerox thought about the nature of work, the role of 
the individual, and the relationship between the individual and the company.  It 
was the first shot in a revolution.  [Brown and Gray, 1995] 
What the observer saw was tech reps often made it a point to spend time 
not with customers but with each other.  They'd gather in common areas, like the 
local parts warehouse, hang around the coffee pot, and swap stories from the 
field.  [Brown and Gray, 1995]  Your average middle manager might have looked 
at this scene and determined that to increase the productivity of these workers; 
management could do a better job of routing their tech reps, eliminate the 
conversations and dead time and thus create a more efficient workforce.  
Fortunately for Xerox, the observer was trained as a cultural anthropologist who 
recognized the value in the time spent with co-workers.  The observer recognized 
the time at the warehouse was anything but dead.  The tech reps were not 
slacking off; they were doing some of their most valuable work.  Field service, it 
turns out, is no job for lone wolves.  It is a social activity.  Like most work, it 
involves a community of professionals.  The tech reps weren't just repairing 
machines; they were also co-producing insights about how to repair machines 
better.  [Brown and Gray, 1995] 
These tech reps epitomized knowledge workers.  Through their informal 
conversations and exchanges taking place in the warehouse, coffee mess, and 
water coolers, knowledge transfer was taking place.  Because of the observer’s 
findings, Xerox decided to try to expand the use of these informal conversations 
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and did so in the name of innovation and learning.  Xerox began a pilot program 
in the Denver area, issuing two-way radio headsets to each of their tech reps. 
They called the radio frequency over which the tech reps communicated the 
“knowledge channel.”  Using these two way radios the tech reps were able to ask 
each other questions, to identify problems and to share solutions as they came 
up with them.  Though this system improved the transfer of information between 
their workforce, limitations were acknowledged.  The most obvious drawback is 
that this method of communication and transfer was conducted in real time, but 
the only way the knowledge was captured was tacitly in the heads of those 
technicians that happened to be on the “channel” during the discussion.  And if it 
was not recorded, this tacit knowledge could never be made explicit. Recognizing 
this shortfall, Xerox took the next step and, working with their group in France, 
created a system they call Eureka, which by their definition is “an electronic 
knowledge refinery.”  This tool was designed to organize and categorize 
databases of best practices generated by the field staff.  Technically this system 
is a relational database of hypertext documents, but  it is an electronic version of 
war stories told around the coffee pot -- with the added benefits of an institutional 
memory, expert validation, and a search engine.  [Brown and Gray, 1995] 
This system relies on voluntary information exchanges.  Any technician, 
regardless of their rank, can submit a best practice, but they are not required to 
do so nor are they explicitly rewarded for participating.  In Eureka, the payoff 
results in social and intellectual capital: the incentive to be a good colleague, to 
contribute, and to receive knowledge as a member of the community. 
The experiences described provided the catalyst for the massive growth in 
the area of ‘Knowledge Management’.  The potential value of such endeavors 
was made clear to many in the business community, especially those with an eye 
on the bottom line.  Unfortunately, since the government and military specifically 
is not ‘profit oriented’ part of this lesson has been slow to sink in.  As indicated 
earlier, the rate of adoption by the military of emerging best practices from the 
corporate world has been glacial.  Without the pressure to show a profit or 
increase value to shareholders, the progress made has resulted from those 
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military leaders with a clear vision of what these methods can produce in terms of 
productivity and leadership.  
 
2. Las Vegas Online  
The first community in the commercial space we evaluated is the one 
hosted at www.lvol.com.  A screenshot from the site is provided in Figure 3.  
Though not self-defined as a Community of Practice, it exhibits many qualities  
 
Figure 3 Las Vegas Online Screen Shot.  From www.lvol.com 
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of one.  The site contains significant amounts of historical and new knowledge.  
Recognized experts are available to answer the questions of its members. This 
site has registered over 5,000 members, maintains thousands of Las Vegas 
related documents, and over 3.2 million unique visitors have visited the site since 
January 2000 as evidenced by a discussion board area with many topics having 
over 1,000 posts.  Las Vegas Online demonstrates that you can cultivate an 
extremely successful active community base around a small passionate core.  
Through this knowledge exchange, members of this community are able to save 
themselves time and money, which greatly exceeds the cost of participating in 
the community (cost = time). 
 
3. Royal Dutch Shell 
The energy industry is collaborative by nature.  Oil exploration, for 
example, requires talent across many disciplines involving petrophysicists, 
geophysicists, geologists, and engineers, among others.  Many energy firms 
were veterans at collaborative learning and knowledge sharing long before the 
arrival of the Internet.  [McDermott, 1999]  Arie de Geus led strategic planning 
during his 38-year career at Shell, and is widely credited with initiating the 
concept of the learning organization.  He asserts, “The ability to learn faster than 
your competitors may be the only sustainable competitive advantage.” [Haimila, 
2001]  The leadership at Shell believes their ability to discover knowledge and 
disseminate it throughout the organization gives them a competitive advantage 
and helps them to leverage their investments  better than their competition. In the 
mid-1980s, for example, Shell bought exploration leases in the Gulf of Mexico, 
even though it did not yet have the knowledge and technology to explore and drill 
wells in water that deep.  [Haimila, 2001]  The management at the Deepwater 
Division encouraged regular, informal brainstorming sessions among their 
engineers.  The result was that before the leases in the Gulf of Mexico expired, 
this interchange ignited the spark needed to help the engineers figure out how to 
explore and dig deep-water wells.  This type of ‘water-cooler’ discussion is often 
the best way to mine the tacit knowledge required to solve complex problems.  
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“The understanding that knowledge is socially embedded helps Shell to reap 
significant rewards – especially with the advent of the Internet.”  [McDermott, 
1999]  Shell has linked 13 Communities of Practice with more than 10,000 users.  
By Shell’s estimate, it sees benefits of at least $200 million a year from 
community-driven knowledge sharing initiatives. 
 
4. Program Management Community of Practice (PM Community 
of Practice) 
Three years ago, the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) was part of a 
group of DoD organizations brought together by leadership at the Pentagon to 
leverage the principles of knowledge management with a heavy reliance 
communities practice to replace the DoD ‘Deskbook’ System.  Deskbook 
contained a database of acquisition policies, processes, and tools developed in 
1995.  This database represented a first attempt to use on-line databases to 
institutionalize an automated acquisition information process to provide current, 
appropriate and meaningful information and tools for the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense (OSD), Services, Defense Agencies and Acquisition Managers to 
effectively and efficiently acquire products, systems and services.  [Dorohovich, 
2003]  The replacement concept developed by the group consisted of hundreds 
of Communities of Practice providing working knowledge and expertise for DoD’s 
workforce believing that Communities of Practice offered the solution to 
harvesting the tacit knowledge that they would lose over the coming five years. 
During the same time, the U.S. Navy was making significant investments 
in Knowledge Management and expressed interest in leveraging knowledge 
management and Communities of Practice to support its acquisition workforce.  
At the time, the acquisition work force was capturing and sharing best practices 
and lessons learned through the use of existing collaboration technologies.  
[www.PMCoP.navy.mil, 2003], but the cost of providing personalized consulting 
support to Navy program offices was growing increasingly expensive.  Working 
together in the same DoD Knowledge Management team, the Navy and DAU 
partnered together to develop the Program Management Community of Practice 
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(PM Community of Practice) (Figure 4) designed to reduce consulting costs, to 
improve professional development of its members and to create a place where 
members of the community could come and learn from one another. 
In February 2001, a group of senior DoD Program Managers and Deputy 
Program Managers met for two days of community building activities.  The   
Figure 4 PMCoP Screen Shot.  From the PM Community of Practice 
Website at www.pmcop.navy.mil 
requirements identified by the group were used to create the PM Community of 
Practice website.  The main PM Community of Practice site contains sub-
communities established for Systems Engineering, Contract Management, Risk 
Management, and Total Ownership Cost.  PM Community of Practice launched 
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for public access in October 2001 at the DoD Program Executive Office and 
Systems Commander Conference.  [www.PMCoP.navy.mil, 2003] 
The PM Community of Practice provides acquisition workers with the 
ability to locate knowledge on demand, from any location, with confidence that it 
has been validated by the community.  To make this knowledge transfer happen, 
PM Community of Practice provides tools to assist with tasks and grants access 
to the knowledge and experience of others who have already completed similar 
tasks.   The Navy’s vision for PM Community of Practice was designed to provide 
the acquisition worker with relevant knowledge-on-demand through the 
establishment and progressive development of specific acquisition communities.  
They decided on an evolutionary, community-based approach that integrated 
government and industry workers to capture knowledge.  [Tomoye, 2003]  PM 
Community of Practice provides acquisition professionals across DoD with 
knowledge-sharing opportunities, problem-solving capabilities, and a source for 
continuous learning. The following is one example from the PMCoP website of 
how this Community of Practice has benefited its members;   
 
The Experience of one PM CoP Community Member 
Steve Parker was a new program manager with the 
U.S. Navy working on the AEGIS program’s livefire test - 
i.e. testing that the weapon would work. His battle group 
consisted of an aircraft group and aircraft carriers that had 
full radar capability – very powerful ships. Steve was 
tasked with developing a risk management process for the 
livefire test. He spent three months laboring over his plan 
and one week before it was due, an editor at PM CoP put 
him in touch with Art Willoughby, a veteran Risk Manager 
with 30 years experience. Art reviewed Steve’s draft Plan 
of Action and Milestones (POA&M, made experienced 
suggestions and shared his own risk management plans – 
all with the goal of helping Steve succeed. 
 
“I could have saved an entire month of research 
and work by using PM CoP’s resources from the start.” – 
Steve Parker, novice Risk Manager 




Now, less than two years after the launch of PM Community of Practice, 
the site has attracted over 3000 registered members, added more than 8000 
knowledge contributions, grown four primary communities, established two 
special interest areas, and started over 40 workspaces.  The site administrators 
estimate that community membership grows at a rate between 30 to 50 people a 
week.  The continued growth in membership at PMCoP demonstrates that once 
people realize the value in a community like PMCoP they not only become 
members, but also tell others about the benefit of the site, generating more 
members and an increased knowledge and skill base.    
 
5. CompanyCommand.com 
In the January 2000 Federal Computer Week article “Cultural Change 
Trumps Technology” by Craig Sincock, the US Army’s task force leader for 
enterprise network, a position in the new office of the Chief Integration Officer 
(CXO) he stated “The Army is moving forward with its cultural changes, new 
business practices, ‘infostructure’ management and Army Knowledge Online 
portal upgrades, but needs to do a better job of ‘mentoring and training future 
leaders.’  He further suggested that ‘Bureaucracies don't do that well,’ but the 
Army is working on it.”  At the time Mr. Sincock did not know about a burgeoning 
Community of Practice whose focus was established to overcome the very 
shortfall he identified.   
CompanyCommand.com (Figure 5) was created by four enterprising 
young Army Officers whose mission is to “connect company commanders--past, 
present, and future--together in a conversation specifically about building 
effective units.”  [CompanyCommand.com, 2003]  The founders of this 
community believe that “professionals who are fiercely resolved to prepare for 
combat and who continually share what they are learning with each other will be 
more effective and will grow more effective, combat-ready units.”  




 Figure 5 CompanyCommand.com Screen Shot.  From the 
CompanyCommand.com Website at www.companycommand.com 
 
a) How They Started  
Two Army Officers, Nate Allen and Tony Burgess met 
at West Point in 1987, and both commissioned as Infantry 
Officers in 1990.  Nate served in the 10th Mtn Div, the 509th 
Infantry Battalion (JRTC OPFOR), and the 25th ID (L).  Tony 
went to the 82nd Abn Div and then to the 25th ID (L) where 
Nate and he were neighbors and commanded companies in 
the same Brigade.   
The way things worked out Nate and Tony both spent 
a long time on Brigade Staff before taking command – Tony 
spent 18 months and Nate knocked out over 24!  During 
their time in “purgatory,” they observed other commanders 
and took note of both the good and the bad that they saw.  
While in command they kept notes and continued to share 
ideas, usually during the evening when they hung out on 
their front porch talking about what was going on in their 
companies.  They thought, “Wouldn’t it be great if 
commanders could easily share their ideas with like-minded 
leaders across the Army?”  Every Captain that they talked to 
got excited about finding a way to better share ideas and, to 
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an Officer, everyone had already considered capturing some 
of their command experiences in writing.  However, there 
was no easy forum for this to happen and, once out of 
command, most Captains were off to the next busy 
assignment with no established system for them to remain 
tapped into Company Command. 
For many Army Officers, Company Command is 
professionally the greatest experience their lives.  They 
naturally spend time reflecting on it and have the desire to 
both remember it and pass on some of what they learned 
and experienced to others.  Those who are preparing to take 
command naturally would love to tap into the ideas and 
insights of the thousands who have gone before them. 
As the Internet exploded, Nate and Tony realized that 
the web was the vehicle to accomplish what they wanted to 
do.  By chance, they ran into Steve Schweitzer who 
volunteered to build the web page (for free!), and the ball 
was rolling.  Over the course of two months, they grew a 
team of Officers who offered up their input and time to help 
make CompanyCommand.com a reality.  The original team 
included Pete Kilner, Tom Woodie, Chris Engen, and Steve 
Delvaux.  On 2 February 2000, they purchased the domain 
name CompanyCommand.Com and Steve Schweitzer 
began building the actual web page.  [Burgess and Allen, 
2003] 
b) What CompanyCommand.com Has Accomplished 
The establishment and support of this Community of Practice constituted 
an all-volunteer effort until this year.  The success of the site has led the 
CompanyCommand.com Team to seek additional support directly from the Army.  
Based on the metrics used by the CompanyCommand.com team to evaluate the 
value of their site, they have proven very successful.  “CompanyCommand.com 
uses the quantitative measures of unique/repeat visitors, number of downloads, 
and subjects searched for and found, submission rates and time saved in wheel 
re-invention.”  [Nate Allen, 2003]  In 2002, the CompanyCommand.com site 
served 352,000 unique visitors who downloaded 136 gigabytes of information, 
logged 16 million hits, and viewed 2.7 million pages. With the ongoing 
deployments in early 2003 related to the operations in Iraq, the 
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CompanyCommand.com team saw a marked increase in the activity in their 
Community of Practice.  They experienced record levels of activity in January 
and February 2003.  For example, in January alone they witnessed 60,000 
unique visits, logged 2.6 million hits and served over half a million downloads.  
The most popular downloads were products that support unit deployments to the 
Persian Gulf – Such as after action reports (AAR’s) and lessons learned from 
previous Gulf operations, deployment checklists, NBC operations and advice and 
tools for unit family readiness groups.  [CompanyCommand.com Team, 2003]  
CompanyCommand.com has since partnered with The United States 
Military Academy (West Point), and three of the original four members of the 
team are enroute to institutions of higher learning to earn PhD’s before returning 
to West Point as permanent professors.  The Army has recognized the value in 
the Community of Practice created by these young Officers and has pledged to 
support the further development and growth of their Community of Practice as 
well as developing and supporting Communities of Practice at other levels of 
leadership (i.e., PlatoonLeader.org).   
These examples provide a quick look at some successful Communities of 
Practice in several different types of organizations.  Thousands of examples of 
Communities of Practice exist in the commercial space.  These Communities of 
Practice operate in one form or another for most interests, from raising rabbits to 
repairing cars, e.g. www.doityourself.com.  In the corporate space, thousands of 
Communities of Practice thrive, all recognizing the benefit of such tools.  In the 
federal government and specifically the military, many groups can be considered 
by definition a Community of Practice, whether or not the participants are aware 
that they comprise one. 
The Chief’s mess, where senior enlisted personnel dine aboard Navy 
vessels, constitutes one such community. They also gather to share their 
experiences and talk about what is working and not working for them in their 
work areas.  They trade best practices, exchange lessons learned and create 
new ideas for overcoming the challenges they face.  Though not widespread, 
Communities of Practice are becoming an integral part of the way the some Navy 
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organizations do business in the 21st century.  Once viewed by many as just 
another management fad, Communities of Practice have emerged as a stunning 
success in the everyday business operations of these organizations.  
Communities of Practice have contributed to the competitive advantage of 
organizations using them by bridging the knowledge gap within the organization.  
These Communities of Practice provide a forum for knowledge workers and 
warriors to exchange thoughts, ideas, insights, best practices, and to find 
solutions to real problems.  
  
C. BUILDING SUCCESSFUL COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE 
Throughout our research, we found many checklists, ideas, and 
recommendations for building successful Communities of Practice.  Some came 
from industry, e.g., Tomoye (www.tomoye.com), others from the academic press 
like the book Cultivating Communities of Practice, by Etienne Wenger and one 
Navy specific guide developed at Naval Sea System Command called The 
NAVSEA Communities of Practice Practitioners Guide that we have provided as 
an appendix to this thesis.  There are as many guides available for building 
successful Communities of Practice, as there are definitions of knowledge 
management.  To make this discussion more manageable, we have chosen to 
highlight only the ones that we used. One of the more authoritative guides 
available today is in the book Cultivating Communities by Etienne Wenger, 
Richard McDermott, and William Snyder, three well-known authors in the fields of 
knowledge management and Communities of Practice.  The authors provide the 
“seven principles for cultivating Communities of Practice” [Wenger, 2002] shown 
in Figure 6. 
While conducting research for this project, we read many books, articles 
and guides, as well as conducted personal interviews with team members of 
CompanyCommand.com and PMCoP.navy, and believe these seven principles 
capture best what the broad range of guides, tools, checklists, and 
recommendations entail about building and sustaining communities of practice.  
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For any person, group or organization embarking on the creation of a Community 
of Practice we highly recommend this book.   
Seven Principles for Cultivating Communities of Practice 
 
1. Design for Evolution 
2. Open Dialogue for inside and outside perspectives 
3. Invite different levels of participation 
4. Develop both public and private community spaces 
5. Focus on value 
6. Combine familiarity with excitement 
7. Create a rhythm for the community 
Figure 6 Seven Principles for Cultivating Communities of Practice.  After 
“Cultivating Communities of Practice by Wenger, McDermott and Snyder, 
2002 
As part of this thesis, we built a prototype Community of Practice site on 
the Internet.  This research has served as a guide in our design and 
implementation efforts.  The next chapter discusses how we arrived at the 
present state.  Drawing on what we have learned from collaborating with others 
who have grown successful Communities of Practice combined with what we 
have assimilated in our research, we will discuss the design that we believe will 




























V. IMPLEMENTING AN ONLINE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE 
OFFICER COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE 
 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Creating a successful online Community of Practice for a military 
intelligence organization presents several unique challenges.  As described 
earlier, intelligence organizations have grown very reluctant to share information.  
Also, a number of security concerns must be addressed.  Yet, without improving 
the ability to collaborate the community remains open to an unacceptable level of 
risk.   
This chapter will focus on how to proceed with integrating a Community of 
Practice tool, specifically Simplify™ from Tomoye, into the Naval Intelligence 
community.  Realizing that the military often seems reluctant to embrace any sort 
of change, e.g., a fundamental matter of women in combat or a simple issue as 
requiring everyone in the Army to wear the same beret, a very gradual approach 
is recommended.  Our proposal calls for a three-phase implementation strategy.  
Phase I of the pilot program will focus on providing support to operationally 
deployed Naval intelligence Officers at the unclassified level.  While benefiting 
those Officers, the main purpose of phase one is to expose the entire Naval 
intelligence community to the potential of an online collaboration environment.  It 
will also give us, as the primary designers and administrators, a chance to try out 
different templates and procedures in a small and manageable environment.  
Phase II will begin with the establishment of online collaborative 
environments on both the secret and top-secret networks.  It may be necessary 
to divide this phase into two separate tracks, one for each of the networks.  
Phase III will look to expand the original unclassified community established 
during the pilot to include the entire Naval intelligence community, including 
Officers, enlisted personnel and civilians as well as other non-Navy organizations 
that are interested in joining. This third phase will also expand the scope of the 
unclassified community beyond just operationally deployed units to cover a wide 
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variety of topics facing our community.  Phases two and three, as well as the 
potential for expansion to the entire USIC will be discussed in more detail in the 
final chapter of the thesis as a plan for the future.  
The remainder of this chapter will provide a roadmap for community 
creation.  Where applicable we will discuss the various stages of the 
development and why we chose specific options.  The chapter is organized to 
serve as a blueprint for others who may be considering the establishment of their 
own online community as well.  
 
B. WHERE WE ARE NOW 
To understand our approach and recommended course of action we will 
first provide some background information how we arrived at our current stage of 
development.  Our initial proposal for our thesis focused on the theoretical benefit 
that a Community of Practice could provide to Naval intelligence Officers around 
the world, with some discussion on how it could be applied further to the entire 
United States Intelligence community.  The majority of the research was focused 
on examining Communities of Practice, both successes and failures, and 
identifying those aspects that would benefit a military intelligence organization.  
In the early stages of our research the head of information systems from the 
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) visited the Naval Postgraduate School to meet 
with all of the students in the Intelligence Information Management curriculum.  
Upon learning that our research involved studying the applicability of 
Communities of Practice for the intelligence community, he offered to sponsor us.  
However, he wanted to move past just a theoretical piece, and recommend we 
make specific plans to implement an online community.  At that point, our 
research changed dramatically.  No longer just considering the benefits of an 
online Community of Practice, we were now proceeding to evaluate the available 
CoP development tools and recommend the best software package to ONI.  
Realizing that the metrics for a successful Community of Practice in the military 
differ from that for an organization in the private sector we began studying extant 
Communities of Practice in the military. The fundamental difference between 
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Communities of Practice in government and those in the private sector is that in 
government there is no clear mechanism to measure the return on investment in 
a community of practice. During this phase we discovered the program 
management communities (www.pmcop.dau.mil) and CompanyCommand.com.  
(www.companycommand.com). 
 
1. PM CoP  
The main force behind the program management website was Mike 
Dorohovich, a retired Army Officer who was working as an independent 
contractor for the Army helping them develop communities practice.  One of the 
first projects Dorohovich worked on involved the creation of an online Community 
of Practice for the program management community.  He was faced with a 
challenge in that an overwhelming majority of the program management 
community was civilian of whom some 90% were going to retire before 2005. As 
they left , they would take with them their vast amount of experience and 
knowledge that served as the foundation for the program management 
community for the past twenty years.  They believed the way to capture this 
knowledge for future use was through Communities of Practice.  Dorohovich had 
been working with Communities of Practice for sometime and based on his own 
work and his group’s evaluation of existing tools for Communities of Practice, 
they decided that a Canadian company, Tomoye, offered the best software tool 
to facilitate the community development. 
Dorohovich’s group and others pointed to Tomoye.  A technology study by 
Etienne Wenger (See technology map in Appendix 1) identifies only Tomoye and 
one other company whose products squarely focused on the on-line 
infrastructure for building and maintaining Communities of Practice. 
 
2.  CompanyCommand.com.com 
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The similarities between the mission of the CompanyCommand.com.com 
team and our own goals made their model a very interesting one for us to follow.  
CompanyCommand.com’s focuses on improving the quality of leadership at the 
Army company commander level.  More importantly, the CompanyCcommand 
team developed a very successful online military Community of Practice. The 
website was designed to be an immediate attention getter.  The 
CompanyCommand.com team relied on a professional appearance with high 
quality information within the site to help grow their community.  What began as 
just a handful of junior officers now contains over 3,000 members.  While the 
CompanyCommand.com.com site was instrumental to the success of their 
community, it proved a very labor-intensive process for the Webmaster.  Almost 
all of the updates were performed by hand-coding actual HTML code.  Some of 
the nicer features, the scrolling banners, a short list of the latest posts, the 
different surveys were created manually and the resulting displays created by 
hand.  As CompanyCommand.com grew it became apparent that the 
CompanyCommand Team would not be able to sustain their website in its 
current form.  They began searching for a commercial solution for their 
Community of Practice.  Using some of Dorohovich’s research and evaluation, 
and their own analysis process, they identified Tomoye’s Simplify™ software as 
their best option.  Tomoye’s product contained all of the functionality that the 
CompanyCommand.com team needed and the added bonus of not charging a 
‘per seat’ licensing fee.  Most of the other commercial products charge a per seat 
fee for each registered user, which make them an economically prohibitive 
approach for most military communities.   
Having talked with Mike Dorohovich and the CC team, Tomoye became 
our immediate frontrunner.  To ensure that the recommendations and justification 
would also apply to the intelligence community, we arranged for the government 
account executive for Tomoye to travel to the Naval Postgraduate School and 
present their Simplify™ product.  In conjunction with this visit, Tomoye 
established a temporary websites using the Simplify™ software and granted us 
access for demonstration purposes.  After a brief training period, consisting of an 
hour-long conference call, we were able to create a virtual community space on 
Tomoye’s temporary site.  During the account executive’s presentation, we 
learned that Tomoye was preparing to release its first major rewrite of the 
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Simplify™ product and migrate to a new enterprise Edition.  This new addition 
would be priced on a per seat basis, just like the majority of the other commercial 
products.  This per seat arrangement raised the potential for making the Tomoye 
product cost prohibitive for the Naval intelligence online community.  We also 
learned that any organization that purchased the current Server Edition from 
Tomoye would be ‘grandfathered’ in under the current flat fee and would receive 
the upgrade to the Enterprise edition when it was released.  Realizing that our 
thesis conclusion would be to recommend to ONI that the Naval intelligence 
community use Tomoye’s Simplify™, and not wanting to incur the higher per seat 
fees, we contacted our sponsor.  He concurred with our recommendation and 
arranged for ONI to purchase the Tomoye product and associated hardware.  
Suddenly we found ourselves with a Community of Practice software tool 
installed on a server with only some initial thoughts on how to get the community 
up and running. 
 
C. HARDWARE  
Our first hurdle actually required us to retrace a step.  An issue emerged 
with running the tool on a single server.  Seeing the potential for large potential 
number of concurrent users, three thousand under our current license and 
software configuration, a single server may become overloaded.  A more 
optimized solution would necessitate installing a web server in front for user 
interaction and a database server behind from which the web server can pull the 
required data.   
This configuration required us to wait until ONI could build and configure 
another server for our use.  While only a minor setback, less than a week, it 
could have been avoided by stating the dual server configuration requirement up 
front.  Servers outside of ONI’s firewalls were needed as well.  Due to the nature 
of ONI’s work, their firewall limits the types of connections that can be made from 
the outside.  Because of their security posture, setting up the servers behind the 
firewall would prove unreasonably difficult.  Since the idea of a Community of 
Practice is built on information sharing, and Simplify TM incorporates some built-in 
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user management and security tools/capabilities/functions, we decided to locate 
the servers outside the firewall for maximum availability, currently in an area 
called the demilitarized zone (DMZ), allowing access from any internet-
connected computer.  
 
D. THE PILOT PROGRAM 
While we have condensed a significant portion of the design process in 
this chapter, the bulk of the work required to create a successful online 
Community of Practice would take place during the pilot program.  The success 
of any follow-on phase will depend on how well both the senior leadership and 
the junior Officers, who will form the overwhelming majority of the participants in 
the community, respond to the pilot.  Unless it can be shown that the time that 
intelligence Officers are spending online provides a tangible benefit to these 
already time-strapped analysts, they will not return.  It will also be necessary to 
pinpoint how these benefits extend to the individual’s parent organization in order 
to gain command approval.  Without demonstrating how the organization 
benefits, the leadership may be unwilling to allow its members to spend their 
valuable time sharing within the Community of Practice.   
With so much riding on the success of the pilot, we have decided to rely 
heavily on the CompanyCommand.com model.  After numerous e-mails, 
telephone conversations and a trip to West Point we hope not to make the same 
mistakes and not re-learn the same lessons that they have experienced over the 
past three years.   
 
E. FORMING THE TEAM 
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Managing a successful Community of Practice, especially in its infancy, 
can prove somewhat labor intensive.  Only a handful of people will realize the 
potential benefits of a Naval Intelligence Community of Practice right away.  As 
such, it is difficult to find members willing to dedicate the time to moderate the 
various topics and provide most of the initial content.  With most Communities of 
Practice, the vast majority of the content is provided by only a very small 
percentage of the members.  Until we develop an adequate membership pool, 
the community will not contain enough of these active participants to be self-
sustaining.  If left on its own, the data would become stale and the site irrelevant.  
To ensure that the initial site is engaging enough to generate repeat visitors and 
to develop the active recurring population  we have recruited two other Officers to 
augment the core team.  Again learning from CompanyCommand.com, we 
recruited an Officer with a very strong HTML background.  While the Tomoye tool 
is very simple to set up and manage out of the box, customizing the display 
templates requires extensive HTML coding knowledge.  As part of the enterprise 
edition expected later this summer, Tomoye has developed an interactive 
questionnaire/survey/quiz feature.  CompanyCommand.com makes extensive 
use of surveys, questionnaires, and quizzes to generate and guide discussions.  
In the interim, this type of interactive feature requires a Webmaster with HTML 
and other web language coding skills.  The other member of the core team is a 
fellow junior Officer, with prior enlisted experience as intelligence specialist, who 
recently completed a tour as the aide to Director of Naval Intelligence. 
 
1. Target Audience 
With the core team on board, it was time to identify our target audience.  
We started with a very narrow focus and audience, supporting the deployed 
Naval intelligence Officer.  This group provides us Intelligence Officers that stand 
to gain significantly from an online Community of Practice.  A majority of these 
Officers are working in their first tour.  After only a few months of training at the 
Basic Intelligence Officer Course, these mostly junior Officers suddenly find 
themselves deployed with carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups 
around the world.  With no afloat experience, they are suddenly thrust into the 
position of providing timely intelligence to the Warfighter.  Their inexperience 
coupled with insecurity can result in them not seeking assistance for even the 
simplest problems.  By providing an online community where these Officers can 
ask questions outside of their peer group, we can provide an environment where 
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they will feel free to ask any question, no matter how trivial or simple it may 
seem. 
The site may offer an opportunity to assist these new Officers in their 
professional development as well.  Many will find themselves in leadership roles 
with two or three junior enlisted personnel working for them.  Unlike their 
counterparts in the line communities, who rely heavily on their Chief Petty Officer 
during their first tour, many will not benefit from the counsel of a senior enlisted 
person. Navy1630.com will offer these Officers a chance to seek advice from the 
senior intelligence specialists and provide them the freedom to ask questions that 
they might otherwise be too embarrassed to ask in person.   
 
2. Membership Drive 
After identifying the target audience, the value of establishing membership 
in the community must be made apparent.  As explained earlier, successful 
Communities of Practice reject the simple ‘if you build it, they will come’ premise.  
The community must be branded, publicized, and supported by the highest 
echelon within an organization and potential members courted.  Just informing 
Naval intelligence Officers who are spread all over the globe that such an online 
community exists represents a challenge.  Simply sending out a record message 
providing a URL for the site and mandating that all Naval intelligence Officers 
register at the website would seem a simple way to require usage, but that 
approach would undermine our long-term goal.  As much as the military relies on 
orders, it would set the wrong tone.  Communities that try to force participation 
routinely fail.  We need to grow our community in a way that fosters long-term 
participation.  Community members must develop a sense of belonging, almost a 
sense of obligation completely on their own.  Our belief based on the experience 
by CompanyCommand.com and other Communities of Practice, indicates that 
the best way to create this type of devoted member is to rely on word of mouth to 
advertise the community’s existence and benefits.  A significant amount of time 
would be required if we relied solely on word of mouth to broadcast the message 
so we have identified fellow intelligence Officers to help.  We laid out a map of 
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the world and identified Officers in each major concentration of Naval Intelligence 
Officers with whom we have worked; Officers who are also dedicated to 
improving our profession.  
 
3. Topic Leads 
In addition to serving as our first phase marketing team, we are also 
asking these individuals to serve as topic leads.  Topic leads will pick their own 
set of topics to moderate.  As moderators, their role includes monitoring 
discussion threads to ensure that all of the posts fall in line with our mission of 
improving intelligence Officers’ ability to support the Warfighter.  The bulk of their 
work will be directed to provide content during the initial start-up, as we expect 
the community to become mostly self-regulating.  CompanyCommand.com as 
well as many other military communities have been surprised at how actively 
involved the individual members of the community become in guiding topic 
discussion and ensuring other members adhere to established netiquette. As 
members they do not want to see bad advice or manners being dispensed online 
and are quick to offer their opinions and views should they disagree with the 
nature or tenor of a post. 
  
4. Joining the Community 
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Once our target audience is made aware of the existence of 
navy1630.com, we need them to join.  It may seem a simple component to the 
development of the community but the details require careful consideration.    
CompanyCommand.com realized that unreasonable limitations on their members 
are extremely counterproductive to the community.  Depending on the Officers’ 
assignments, their target audience may only possess the time and resources to 
participate from home, which would prove difficult under the Army’s proposed 
card reader configuration.  Thus, the CompanyCommand.com team has avoided 
any limiting access controls to their community.  Anonymous users, users who 
have not signed in or even created an account, can access almost the entire 
CompanyCommand.com website.   
Unfortunately, we cannot adopt all of CompanyCommand.com’s open 
access policies.  While the pilot program will remain unclassified, some of the 
information posted within the navy1630 community may be of a sensitive nature.  
To restrict access to authorized users our community mandates users to login to 
the website using a user created account.  Account creation is another procedure 
that requires us to differ from CompanyCommand.com.  Their site is currently 
configured to allow anyone to create an account.  A user simply visits the 
CompanyCommand.com.com website and clicks on Create an Account.  This 
action launches a small online form in which the user supplies basic biographical 
data including an e-mail address.  Upon completing this form, a username and 
corresponding password are sent to the e-mail account supplied by the user.  
Anyone who visits the site can therefore gain access, whether in the Army or not.  
Our community needs a slightly more restrictive policy for account creation.  
Using one of the options with the Tomoye tool, we have changed the Create an 
Account feature to Request an Account.  The user still fills out the same 
biographical data form but upon completion, e-mail is generated and sent to the 
chief editor requesting an account.  Currently the only criterion for account 
creation requires that the requestor be able to provide a .mil e-mail address for 
receipt of their login name and password.  After the initial setup, the user may 
then change their registered e-mail address to any account they desire.  Our 
policies may not be as open as the CompanyCommand.com policies, but after 
the initial account registration, our users will also be able to participate from any 
Internet connected computer.   
 
5. No Command Logos 
Another lesson that the CompanyCommand.com team learned was that 
regardless of what organization actually hosts the website, no attempt should be 
made for an organization to take ‘ownership’ of the community.  For example 
CompanyCommand.com website is currently being hosted on servers at the US 
Military Academy at West Point.  Officials at West Point originally wanted to place 
an academy logo somewhere on the website’s homepage.  The 
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CompanyCommand.com team explained that this association would prove very 
counterproductive to their mission.  Whether deserved or not, every organization 
and institution brings associated ‘baggage’ (e.g., peoples impression of the 
organization), some good and some bad.  To insure the widest possible 
membership the site must be kept free of any negative stigma brought by 
association of the site with any given organization. CompanyCommand.com 
solved the problem by designing their own logo and giving the community its own 
identity.  They also registered the CompanyCommand.com website in the ‘.com’ 
domain, which allowed them to at least give the appearance that Department of 
the Army was not even involved.  This configuration allows members to share 
more freely and without fear of reprisal.  While this practice cannot be adopted on 
the classified networks, we will utilize a ‘.com’ URL during the pilot program.  
After receiving confirmation that ONI would purchase and host the Simplify™ 
tool, we registered ‘Navy1630’ in the ‘.com’ domain; 1630 is the designator for 
Naval intelligence Officers.  We are also registering ‘Navy1630.navy.mil’ with The 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).  At first, we considered 
incorporating ‘intelligence’ or ‘intel’ into the site title but realized that we may 
draw unnecessary attention to ourselves.  The server itself remains within the 
.mil network, but the Tomoye tool allows us to control what website is displayed 
on the user’s navigation bar within the browser.   
 
6.  Anonymous Posts 
One of the biggest concerns voiced about our proposal is that the 
community would degenerate into a free-for-all or name calling session. To 
ensure that certain standards of decorum are maintained we have restricted 
users’ ability to post documents or messages anonymously.  Users may submit 
an item for anonymous posting but the editor for that individual topic must first 
approve the proposed post.  The editor can either approve the anonymous post 




7. The Content 
After spending considerable time and effort setting up the mechanics of 
the community site we have begun to focus on the actual content of the website.  
Presently, we have identified four top-level topics – On the horizon, Operations, 
Detailing, and The Cruise Box. While we envision eventually expanding this 
number, especially during the later phases of the implementation, we are limiting 
ourselves to topics that will pertain directly to our target audience during the pilot 
phase.  Additionally only a few subdivisions will be initially permitted under each 
of the top-level topics.  As the community grows, it will be necessary to subdivide 
each of the topics further to maintain order. During the initial startup, however, 
we wanted to populate all topic areas with content.  In addition, while we may 
propose where the subdivisions should occur we will use the first few months of 
the pilot program to monitor the various discussion threads and identify those 
topics that warrant their own defined areas.    
The most labor intensive of the top-level topics, “On the horizon…” will 
also provide our biggest draw for new members.  This section will change each 
month and allow us to spotlight a particular subject of current interest to the 
Naval intelligence community.  For example, should the United States find itself 
supporting another major United Nations peacekeeping operation, we would 
feature ‘intelligence support to peacekeeping operations’ that month.  The main 
page would include a survey or questionnaire related to peacekeeping to serve 
as initial attention getter.  We would post interviews with senior members who 
have previously been involved in similar operations as well as related 
publications and doctrine.  A fictional scenario would be posted that would 
challenge the members with a corresponding quiz designed to highlight some of 
the more difficult aspects of providing intelligence support to peacekeeping 
operations.  After completing the quiz, the member would be able to see how 
their answers compared to other members of the community and participate in 
various discussion threads.  “On the horizon” offers the new member a simple 
way to begin to interact with the community.  The quizzes and the surveys will be 
specifically designed to provoke thought and to generate vibrant conversation 
66 
about the various topics.  We will specifically be looking for situations where the 
formally approved doctrine differs from what is actually happening in the field. 
CompanyCommand.com takes advantage of their location at West Pont to 
interview various officials that are brought in to speak to the Corps of Cadets.  
These individuals can range from the Chief of Staff of the Army, General 
Shinsheki to the U.S. commander in Iraq, General Tommy Franks.  The 
CompanyCommand.com team records the interview with a digital video camera 
and the edits the interview into one or two minute video clips and posts them to 
their website.  For example, one of their recent clips featured the task force 
commander during Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan discussing how to lead 
troops during combat.  This type of content gives their community members a 
chance to learn from individuals whom they would never meet otherwise.   
We can extend this practice to returning battle groups to generate 
additional Horizon topics.  As the battle group intelligence Officers return and 
provide their debriefs we can encourage them to post what they believe helped 
them most during their cruise.  They will be able to highlight what worked and 
what did not and ways to improve the process.  We essentially will be able to 
take the formal, and arguably antiquated ‘lessons learned’ process, and turn it 
into a value-added process.  Those preparing to deploy will be able to request 
additional information related to a particular report and receive feedback from 
those that were actually there.  
 
8. Other Content Areas 
In addition to “On the horizon,” the second top-level topic, Operations, 
focuses on the direct support of operationally deployed Intelligence Officers.  
This section is further subdivided into each of the different types of operational 
tours, carrier battle group, amphibious ready group, patrol and reconnaissance 
squadrons, and Special Operations Forces (SOF).  These subtopics will serve as 
‘one stop shop’ for all of the unclassified information needed for a successful 
deployment.  Everything from ship and aircraft recognition guides to 
recommendations for the best hotel for a squadron admin in Sydney will be 
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posted here.  Deployed or soon to deploy Officers can use the discussion 
threads to solicit advice from those who have recently returned.  Problems that 
arose during a particular deployment that may not have reached the reporting 
threshold of the formal lessons learned process would now be shared between 
battle groups.   
The third top-level topic is Detailing, which pertains to the entire Naval 
intelligence community, especially the junior Officers.  While outside the scope of 
our initially defined target audience the decision was made to include a section 
devoted to the detailing process.  Negotiating one’s next assignment makes up 
one of most important aspects of an intelligence Officer’s career.  With so many 
jobs spread across the entire globe, Officers are sometimes very limited in their 
knowledge of what assignments actually entail.  Whether it’s as simple as how 
long is the typical work day for a particular assignment to soliciting advice about 
the quality of the local school systems, there always seem to be more questions 
than answers.  Transfers also exert a significant stress on the entire Officer’s 
family.  An official sponsor program is already in place to try to assist transferring 
members, but the amount of support can vary widely.  By leveraging the 
advantages associated with a Community of Practice for collaboration and 
information sharing, we hope to provide a higher level of support and lower the 
amount of frustration associated with choosing and transferring to a new 
assignment.  For community development purposes, Detailing, just like the On 
the horizon and Operations, offers us a chance to increase the number of initial 
members.  
The fourth top-level topic is The Cruise Box.  In the Navy, deploying 
squadrons and air wings utilize cruise boxes to transfer all of their equipment 
from their commands ashore to the aircraft carrier.  Absolutely everything they 
can possibly need during a six-month deployment, ranging from personal side 
arms to maps and aeronautical charts are crammed into cruise boxes and 
transferred to the ship.  In the Navy1630.com website The Cruise Box looks  
much like the library at other sites and will serve in much the same manner as 
actual boxes; providing a centralized area for any of the various information 
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resources that an intelligence officer may require.  Some of the types of 
information available here will be unclassified briefing templates (i.e., for cyclic 
operations briefings), examples for any number of reports that are written while 
underway, e.g, awards, and even port visit information.  The reader who has not 
deployed may ask “why?”  When the carrier deploys, the different units onboard 
rely on their intelligence officers not only for intelligence support, but when pulling 
into ports for a visit, they are called upon to provide timely information for the 
pending port visit.  This information usually includes the best locations for an 
admin (central location for the squadron to base their ashore social activities 
from), security precautions, places to see, and things to do while there. 
 
F.  ADDITIONAL FEATURES 
We have identified several features that would improve our community 
and submitted them to Tomoye for consideration.  Two of the most beneficial 
components include a personnel skill set database with an extensive search 
capability and a Peek’ feature.  The skill set database would require initial data 
collection from each community member during the account creation.  To 
minimize the impact on the individual members we would recommend accessing 
the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) databases to import readily available 
data, including previous assignments, language skills, and any special school or 
qualifications.  Users would then only need to enter any experiences or skills they 
have added which has not already been captured in their service record.  For 
example, an intelligence Officer may have spent a year abroad as part of their 
undergraduate studies, or perhaps they traveled to a little known country as part 
of church trip.  Currently these types of experiences are not recorded and thus 
impossible to identify unless volunteered during a crisis.  Even the basic skills, 
such as language proficiency, are not easily searched or cross-referenced.  If a 
crisis erupted in a developing nation, where the inhabitants spoke a very rare 
language, it would take days to assemble an intelligence support team with the 
required skills and experiences.  Under the current system, an Intelligence 
Officer who spent a considerable amount of time within the country of concern 
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possibly would be completely overlooked for the mission for the simple fact the 
Officer was not currently stationed in theater.  By incorporating a skill set 
database as part of the Community of Practice, senior leadership could access a 
list of qualified candidates and their current locations.  Accessing BUPERS data 
raises questions of security of information, but as the community grows, these 
and other ideas and opportunities require further consideration.  
The second recommendation calls for a Peek feature.  We envision this 
capability as a tool for senior leadership to gain some insight into the junior 
officer community.  Several areas will be restricted to junior Officers only.  These 
areas are specifically designed to allow junior Officers to ask questions or voice 
concerns without fear of reprisal.  In a very similar manner to the omission of 
command logos as part of the community, establishing a junior Officer area 
allows these young Officers to develop their own strong sense of community. 
However, the senior leaders may desire to see what junior officers rank as hot 
issues.  The Peek feature would allow selected senior leaders to view the posts 
within the junior officer areas but the names of the posters, and any names that 
appear in posts, cross referenced against the member database, will be 
removed.   
 
G. SUMMARY 
As illustrated in this chapter even the smallest details regarding site 
construction, content population, and membership solicitation require careful 
consideration during the creation of an online Community of Practice.  Making 
the wrong decision can discourage user membership and participation and 
ultimately lead to the failure of the community.  With very little room for error 
during the pilot phase, we have relied heavily on the best practices from other 
military Communities of Practice.  However, these models can only take us so 
far.  Once the community officially opens for business, we will be faced with an 
entirely new set of challenges.  As the community begins to grow, situations 
unique to our community will arise and we will not be able to rely on the 
experience of others to direct our course of action.  During this process, we can 
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take one more important lesson from the CompanyCommand.com team, i.e., 
remain focused on the mission.  As a matter of procedure the 
CompanyCommand.com team begins their regular meetings with one member 
reading their mission statement.  As CompanyCommand.com.com has evolved, 
situations have caused the team to get off track and they found themselves on 
tangents that not in line with their mission.  As we are faced with our own unique 
situations, it will be important to keep our mission as the primary focus.  We 
realize that we will make mistakes but believe that we have set a strong 
foundation for our Community of Practice that will allow us the flexibility to correct 
our errors, learn from them and move on.  The greatest asset we gain through 
this whole process is a population in the Naval intelligence community that wants 
to improve our profession and realizes a need to improve our analytical 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 
SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ONLINE NAVAL 
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER COMMUNITY OF PRACTICE 
We have accomplished most of our goals and exceeded our original 
expectations for this thesis.  What began as a theoretical piece with the hope of 
identifying the potential benefits from establishing a Community of Practice for 
the Naval Intelligence Officer community has progressed rapidly to the 
implementation phase.  We have created an interactive, but up to this point 
empty, knowledge library called The Cruise Box.  Additionally, Navy1630.com 
comes complete with an ‘Officer’s club’, the discussion threads for vibrant 
interactions and lively debates about issues facing our community, a ‘theater’, the 
‘On the horizon’ section to spotlight the hot topics and provide immediate 
feedback to the community, a chief’s mess to help mentor our newest Officers 
and help them become better leaders and the flexibility and potential for uses we 
have not considered yet.    
 
A. THE WAY AHEAD 
Our goal with the pilot program is to reach the ‘tipping point’ [Gladwell, 
2003] as soon as possible.  The tipping point for a Community of Practice occurs 
when enough members and active participants make the community self-
sustaining.  Overall guidance and organization of the site will always be needed 
but once the tipping point is reached, we will be able to dedicate our efforts to 




During the next few months, critical steps will be taken to increase the 
awareness of the website’s existence among as many Naval Intelligence Officers 
as possible.  Our approach of utilizing our fellow junior Officers offers a low cost 
technique to gain an initial membership base.  However to increase the 
probability of success and reach the tipping point as soon as possible we need to 
implement a dedicated advertising and marketing plan.   
Senior members of military, who are used to giving orders and expecting 
them to be carried out, may not initially see the value in advertising and 
marketing.  As Companycommand.com realized, this type of mandated approach 
can be very counterproductive.  Members must join voluntarily to begin to foster 
the sense of community vital to its success.  We propose that arrangements be 
made with our next commands to allow both of us to travel to the major Naval 
intelligence concentrations.  The most effective way involves us visiting various 
sites in conjunction with the detailers.  While Naval intelligence Officers may not 
attend a briefing solely about Navy1630.com, they will show up in force to hear 
the latest from the detailer.  In addition, an overview of the online community 
needs to be incorporated to cover those commands and areas that we cannot 
visit in person.  Additionally, a funding line should be established to help support 
the marketing effort.  As intelligence Officers we make our living giving briefs, 
and while we will be able to present a convincing case as to why our fellow 
intelligence Officers should join and participate in Navy1630.com we can be even 
more effective with a few marketing items.  We will design t-shirts, hats, and 
coffee mugs featuring the Navy1630.com logo.  As we travel to various 
commands, we will distribute these items.  Again taking a cue from 
CompanyCommand.com’s experience, these simple items help foster the sense 
of community.  When a member sits down in front of a home computer with a cup 
of coffee in one of our mugs it helps instill a sense of ownership, which might 
result in a more active participant.     
 
C. PHASE II 
Phase II represents the most important aspect of our entire effort, 
improving the analytical ability of Naval intelligence Officers and establishing a 
new collaboration model for the entire intelligence community.  Three major 
issues are associated with establishing a Community of Practice on the classified 
networks: accreditation, membership, and the most challenging, changing the 
culture of the analytical community to accept collaboration readily.   
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Every piece of software that is installed on either the secret or top-secret 
classified networks must undergo an accreditation process.  Due to the nature of 
the information residing on these networks the software must be evaluated for 
any type of vulnerability it may introduce.  While Tomoye’s server edition is 
currently being used in the pilot phase, the accreditation step should be delayed 
until the release of the new Enterprise Edition.  Otherwise, due to the complete 
rewrite of the source code in the new edition, the entire process would be 
repeated.  Initial arrangements are being made for ONI to assist Tomoye during 
the accreditation process starting as soon as the Enterprise Edition is available.  
A related issue may arise due to the fact that Tomoye is a Canadian company 
and some of the networks involved are limited to only U.S. citizens.  Tomoye is 
aware of the need to incorporate U.S. citizens with the appropriate clearance into 
their U.S. offices.  This requirement was already identified by the Army when 
they decided to purchase 1.2 millions seats for the Army wide Community of 
Practice effort.  
Just as with our pilot phase, gaining initial membership and making people 
aware of the existence of community on the classified networks will require a 
dedicated effort.  Setting the pilot program up and running will greatly aid us in 
advertising the new community established during phase II.  With the focus of 
phase two being to increase collaboration and thereby improving the analytical 
capability of intelligence Officers, we should attend the various theater 
intelligence conferences.  As described earlier in chapter two the intelligence 
community has recognized the need to increase collaboration and holds annual 
meeting to discuss some of the high priority intelligence requirements.  At these 
meetings, we will advertise the online community spaces as a natural extension 
of the collaboration effort from the conferences.   
 Changing the culture presents the biggest hurdle.  Unfortunately, 
the road map to  cultural change has not been crafted yet.  Some analysts will 
never adapt to this type of virtual collaboration.  However, a significant portion 
will.  The focus of this change effort will attempt to ensure that community 
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membership and participation provides a rewarding experience for both the 
individuals and their organizations.   
 
D. PHASE III 
Phase III, the expansion of Navy1630.com to include the enlisted 
members of the Naval intelligence community should be the easiest of our three 
phases.   Just as Companycommand.com spawned PlatoonLeader.org, given 
enough time the Navy1630.com expansion would most likely occur naturally.  
However, delayed development and implementation may cost valuable time and 
result in missed opportunities.  To help create a strong sense of community 
among the enlisted intelligence specialists, a separate Community of Practice 
should be established.  Our suggestion is that ONI registers the ‘NavyIS.com’ 
domain name as soon as possible in order to secure this URL for future use.  
The site itself should be hosted on the same server as Navy1630.com, a 
technically feasible solution with the release of the new Enterprise Edition from 
Tomoye.  Dual hosting will allow us to cross-reference topics that both the Officer 
and enlisted community share in common.  It will also facilitate an Ask a Chief 
section in Navy1630.com, allowing those senior enlisted personnel involved to 
login into one site to participate in both. 
In conjunction with the expansion to include the intelligence specialists, we 
recommend that a central support office be created to continue to facilitate and 
improve the communities on both the unclassified and classified networks.  
Ideally, the office should be staffed by two or three permanent parties to ensure 
continuity.  One of the members needs to serve as the technical expert and 
possess a solid HTML background.  The new Enterprise Edition promises to 
simplify the template modification process to a simple drag and drop procedure 
but the HTML skills will still be required for development of more advanced 
features.   
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E. FUTURE 
While it would be valuable to include the expansion of Navy1630.com 
concept to the rest of the USIC, it is well beyond our scope.  Naval Intelligence 
represents only one of fourteen of the agencies that comprise the USIC’s 
bureaucracy. Such an organization may not be ready for the anticipated let alone 
unknown changes that might occur.  However, Navy1630.com can serve as the 
model for the rest of the USIC.  As we implement phase II and transition to the 
classified networks, analysts from other services and agencies will be exposed to 
the Naval intelligence communities.  We believe that once exposed, these non-
Navy analysts will realize the value of such a community and want to become 
members.  In turn, we envision a ‘grass roots’ movement where the junior 
analysts, who culturally appear more open to change and quicker to embrace 
new technologies, demand access to what will then form the U.S. Intelligence 
Community of Practice.   
 
F. FINAL THOUGHTS 
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The Tomoye tool helps create an environment that fosters community 
development, but it remains only a tool.  The success of every Community of 
Practice depends on its members. The Naval intelligence community consists of 
individuals who are dedicated to serving their country to the best of their ability.  
Many times these individuals can become frustrated due to the limitations of 
current systems and realities associated with being intelligence analysts.  The 
attacks on 9/11 should serve as a wake up call to the limitations of operating in a 
fragmented manner and cause us to be more critical of our current practices and 
procedures for intelligence gathering and decision-making.  The USIC looms so 
large and our ability to collect information so great, that information dispersion is 
inevitable and unavoidable. Coupled with the analytical dispersion resulting from 
the ever-increasing mission and potential threats to the United States, the USIC 
continues to operate at an unacceptable risk level.  Establishing a Community of 
Practice will allow us to address some of the most pressing issues by improving 
our analytical capabilities and increasing collaboration among the various 
analysts throughout the world.  The bottom line is that the members of the Naval 
intelligence community bring extraordinary passion to the work of improving the 
way we do business. A Community of Practice can provide an extremely 
powerful tool to facilitate our transformation. 
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The Community of Practice Practitioner’s Guide is designed as a tool for 
establishing and sustaining communities of practice.  The focus of the guide is to 
provide a “how to” approach rather than a “what is” approach.  Comments or 
suggestions on the guide are encouraged.  The point of contact for this document 
is Jill Garcia, SEA 00I, garciajd@navsea.navy.mil, 202.781.3012. 
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